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Has the Time (of Laches) Come?
Recent NaziEra Art Litigation in the
New York Forum
BERT DEMARSIN†
Considering Manhattan’s status as the leading center of
international art trade, courts in New York are an
unsurprisingly prominent venue for resolving disputes
regarding Holocaustrelated art losses. Like all art
litigation, however, these disputes have interesting features
that render the administration of justice in this field a
challenging task. Most notably, the enduring nature of
artwork plays a central role in art litigation, the outcome of
which all too often turns on the question of whether the
original owners timely brought their restitution claim.
Therefore, this Article will describe New York’s twostep
approach for assessing the timeliness of replevin and
conversion actions involving stolen cultural property.
According to Guggenheim v. Lubell, New York law requires
courts first to apply a “demand and refusal” rule in order to
determine the time of accrual for limitation purposes and,
subsequently, to examine the original owner’s diligence in
tracing his property under the doctrine of laches.1
The Article’s primary purpose, however, is to call
attention to the court’s increasing receptiveness to the
limitation and laches defenses in stolen art litigation in
general, and Holocaustrelated title disputes in particular.
Based on a comprehensive survey of all publicly available
† B.A.E.F. Visiting Scholar, Stanford Law School—Postdoctoral fellow of the
Flemish Research Fund. B.A., University of Leuven (Belgium); J.D., University
of Leuven & PanthéonSorbonne (Paris I); J.S.D., University of Leuven. The
author gratefully acknowledges the help and support of Agnes Chong and
Franny Lee.
1. Guggenheim v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991).
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case law of the past fifteen years on the recovery of stolen
art in the New York forum, this Article demonstrates a
shift: the courts are interpreting existing rules to provide
significantly more protection for a good faith purchaser, as
opposed to following New York’s traditional policy of
favoring the original owner.
INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a German
team of archaeologists discovered a small gold Assyrian
amulet in Iraq.2 Along with other artifacts, it was loaded on
a freighter bound for Germany in 1914.3 The outbreak of
World War I, however, forced the freighter to change course
for Portugal, where the items were stored until 1926.4 In
1926, the items were released and shipped to the Berlin
Vorderasiatisches Museum (Ancient Near East Museum).5
There, the gold tablet was inventoried and placed on
display, until, in the looming shadow of World War II, the
museum was closed and the antiquities were placed in
storage.6 In spite of these precautions, museum officials
discovered that the amulet was missing at the end of the
war.7 Decades went by and the loss almost passed into
oblivion.8 Then, in 2006, Hannah Flamenbaum filed an
account as executor of the estate of her father, a Polishborn
Holocaust survivor, who died in the United States in 2003.9
Soon thereafter, Hannah’s brother, Israel, raised multiple
objections to the account, one of which was that it had failed
to properly include the deceased’s coin collection.10 Israel
stated that his father possessed, among other gold coins,
“one item identified as a gold wafer which is believed to be
an ancient Assyrian amulet and the property of a museum
2. In re Flamenbaum, 899 N.Y.S.2d 546, 549 (Sur. Ct. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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in Germany.”11 His attorney informed the Vorderasiatisches
Museum, which demanded return and ultimately filed suit,
seeking recovery of the amulet.12 On March 30, 2010, the
Nassau County Surrogate’s Court dismissed the museum’s
action in replevin.13
The Flamenbaum case is the latest link in a long chain
of fascinating disputes over Naziera looted art that bring
wartime owners and current possessors to New York courts.
In view of New York City’s status as the leading center of
international art trade, the prominence of the New York
forum with respect to art litigation is unsurprising. Despite
the fact that Holocaustrelated title disputes are a rather
recent phenomenon,14 case law on the matter has shed light
on the application of the “demand and refusal” rule and
laches requirements in replevin actions regarding stolen
chattels. After all, these disputes have some interesting
features that render the administration of justice in this
field a challenging task.
Because Naziera title disputes stem from theft and
looting on the European continent, they often encounter the
difficulties regarding forum and applicable law that
typically arise in international litigation. With multiple
crossborder transactions and sovereign decisions of foreign
governments involved, Naziera art litigation tends to be
peppered with thorny issues of public and private
international law.15
This Article, however, is devoted to another feature of
Naziera art litigation. Due to their enduring nature, art
objects challenge the law’s relation to time, which was
established with regard to consumer goods that generally
11. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 554.
14. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving
Beyond the International Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other
Chattels, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 239, 23940 (2004); Helen L. Ostenberg,
International Law in Domestic Forums: The State of the Art, Kunstsammlungen
zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 9 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 179, 19091 (1983); Patricia
Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation Between
Original Owners and Goodfaith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 DUKE L.J. 955, 955
(2001).
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have a shorter life span. Art objects, however, are timeless
artifacts, passed on from generation to generation.
Unfortunately, title problems due to theft and wartime
looting are also passed on with the artwork, so that events
from days long gone may continue to affect the legal status
of many works of art. It is not a coincidence that art
litigation proved pivotal in the development of the law
regarding the limitation of claims for replevin and
conversion.16
Indeed, under common law, invasions of possessory and
property rights are sanctioned by means of these actions in
tort. Like other tort claims, they are barred with the lapse
of time set out in statutes of limitations—legislatively
created mechanisms designed to prescribe the time for
raising claims in legal proceedings.17 Statutes of limitations
stem from the belief that time restrictions are indispensable
to efficient and fair prosecution.18 Indeed, fairness to the
defendant is most likely the primary consideration
underlying the limitation of claims: “There comes a time
16. Actions in replevin or conversion are state common law actions, as U.S.
federal law does not provide a cause of action for the recovery of personal
property. Such actions aim at recovery or damages, not at the criminal
prosecution of the possessor. An action in replevin is “an action for the
repossession of personal property wrongfully taken or detained by the
defendant.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (9th ed. 2009). By bringing an action
in conversion, the true owner seeks monetary damages for the “wrongful
possession or disposition of another’s property as if it were one’s own.” Id. at
381.
17. For some historical background, see, for example, Thomas E. Atkinson,
Some Procedural Aspects of the Statute of Limitations, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 157
(1927) (detailing historical events that have shaped procedural doctrines of
statutes of limitations in English law); Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of
Limitation—Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 13031 (1955); Note,
Developments in the Law—Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1177
80 (1950).
18. Leah E. Eisen, The Missing Piece: A Discussion of Theft, Statutes of
Limitations, and Title Disputes in the Art World, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1067, 1072 (1991); Stephen L. Foutty, Autocephalous GreekOrthodox Church of
Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.: Entrenchment of the Due
Diligence Requirement in Replevin Actions for Stolen Art, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1839,
1842 (1990); Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen Artwork: Deciding Ownership Is
No Pretty Picture, 43 DUKE L.J. 337, 342 (1993). See generally Tyler T. Ochoa &
Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC.
L.J. 453, 460500 (1997) (discussing in detail the rationales for statutes of
limitations).
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when he ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation
that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations.”19
After all, it would not be equitable to be called on to resist a
claim at a time when “evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”20 By barring
potentially stale claims upon the expiration of the statutory
period, an unsuspecting defendant is granted permanent
repose and delivered from the lurking threat of surprise
litigation over matters from days long gone.21 At the same
time, statutes of limitations contribute to the effectiveness
of the judiciary by protecting the judicial system from the
burden of adjudicating inconsequential claims.22 In addition
to providing estimates of fairness and efficiency, statutes of
limitations serve punitive purposes, “depriving a party of
his claim if he does not act promptly in support thereof.”23

19. Note, supra note 17, at 1185; see also Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of
Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former
Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 60
n.61 (1995); Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in
the Context of Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 7576 (2005);
Paulina McCarter Collins, Comment, Has “The Lost Museum” Been Found?
Declassification of Government Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets Offer
Real Opportunity to “Do Justice” for Holocaust Victims on the Issue of Nazi
Looted Art, 54 ME. L. REV. 115, 129 (2002); Hayworth, supra note 18, at 342.
20. Nat’l R.R. Passenger v. Morgan 536 U.S. 101, 125 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Order of R.R. Tels. V. Ry.
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
21. Malveaux, supra note 19, at 76; Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 18, at 494
95; Stephanie Cuba, Note, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of
Limitations on Claims for NaziLooted Art, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447,
461 (1999); John G. Petrovich, Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of
Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1122, 112728
(1980).
22. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (quoting Order of
R.R. Tels., 321 U.S. at 349) (“[Statutes of limitations] are practical and
pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims . . . .”); see
also Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 60 n.61 (quoting Duffy v. Horton Mem’l
Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 820, 82223 (N.Y. 1985)); Malveaux, supra note 19, at 7981
(discussing in detail the efficiency argument); Note, supra note 17, at 1185.
23. Hayworth, supra note 18, at 343; see also Eisen, supra note 18, at 1072;
Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the Museum: A
Proposed Solution to Disputes over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 15, 17
(1998); Malveaux, supra note 19, at 78; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1127. But cf.
Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art,
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As Justice Holmes opined: “[I]f a man neglects to enforce his
rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows
his example.”24 By penalizing dilatoriness, statutes of
limitations “stimulate litigants to prosecute their causes of
action diligently.”25 Further authority for the justification
and policy goals behind statutes of limitations is found in
the Supreme Court’s observation in Riddlesbarger v.
Hartford Insurance Company:
[Statutes of limitations] are founded upon the general experience
of mankind that claims which are valid are not usually allowed to
remain neglected. The lapse of years without any attempt to
enforce a demand creates, therefore, a presumption against its
original validity, or that it has ceased to subsist. This presumption
is made by these statutes a positive bar; and they thus become
statutes of repose, protecting parties from the prosecution of stale
claims, when, by loss of evidence from death of some witnesses,
and the imperfect recollection of others, or the destruction of
documents, it might be impossible to establish the truth. The
policy of these statutes is to encourage promptitude in the
26
prosecution of remedies.

Finally, while these primary considerations run
throughout the law of limitation, another collateral policy
goal is significant in commercial contexts: by granting
repose to those who have dealt in good faith with property,
limitation of claims promotes stability in the market. After
all, upon the expiration of the statutory period, bona fide

YALE L.J. 2437, 245557 (1994) (criticizing the limitation of claims in replevin
and conversion regarding stolen artwork).
24. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897).
25. Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 238 A.2d 169, 172 (N.J. 1968); see also
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (“[Statutes of limitation] promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs. . . . They stimulate to
activity and punish negligence.”); O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J.
1980) (quoting Wood, 101 U.S. at 139); Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277, 279
(N.J. 1961) (quoting Wood, 101 U.S. at 139); Leake v. Bullock, 250 A.2d 27, 29
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969); Mary K. Devereaux, Note, Battle over a Monet:
The Requirement of Due Diligence in a Lawsuit by the Owner Against a Good
Faith Purchaser and Possessor, 9 LOYOLA ENT. L.J. 57, 62 (1989); Hayworth,
supra note 18, at 342; Foutty, supra note 18, at 1842.
26. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1868).
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purchasers will feel more secure in their possessory rights,
thus enhancing the marketability of private property.27
In addition to statutory limitation, the doctrine of
laches has a similar barring effect on claims. Although both
mechanisms endorse the same policy against inertia in legal
proceedings,28 it is important to understand how each time
related defense operates.29 Compared to statutory
limitation, the doctrine of laches, or “estoppel by laches,” is
a more flexible defense. Indeed, the former is sometimes
perceived as leading to a result that is harsh or even
arbitrary. However, it is crucial to understand that statutes
of limitations were precisely established to “cut off rights,
justifiable or not, that might otherwise be asserted.”30 In
doing so, they promote peace and order in society. Finality
27. Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with
the Need for Repose in NaziLooted Art Disputes: Creation of an International
Tribunal, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 155, 199 (2007) (quoting another source); Lerner,
supra note 23, at 17; Alexandre A. Montagu, Recent Cases on the Recovery of
Stolen Art—The Tug of War Between Owners and Good Faith Purchasers
Continues, 18 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 75, 80 (1993); Hayworth, supra note 18,
at 343; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1128; Note, supra note 17, at 1186. But cf.
Bibas, supra note 23, at 245153 (criticizing the statute of limitations’ policy of
maximizing rather than optimizing marketability).
28. Particularly revealing in this respect is the often quoted tenet:
“Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit” (“Equity aids the vigilant, not
those who sleep on their rights.”). See, e.g., Stone v. Williams, 873 F.2d 620, 623
(2d Cir. 1989); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Kamat v.
Kurtha, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107102, at *1213 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2008); see
also HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 28, at 71
76 (2d ed. 1948); Ashraf Ray Ibrahim, The Doctrine of Laches in International
Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 647, 647 (1997); Uisdean R. Vass & Xia Chen, The
Admiralty Doctrine of Laches, 53 LA. L. REV. 495, 497 (1992).
29. For more details on the doctrine of laches as implemented by U.S. courts,
see Thomas G. Robinson, Note, Laches in Federal Substantive Law: Relation to
Statutes of Limitation, 56 B.U. L. REV. 970, 97188 (1976); MCCLINTOCK, supra
note 28, at § 28; Vass & Chen, supra note 28, at 495; Note, supra note 17, at
118385. For more information on the defense of laches in the specific context of
claims in replevin regarding stolen artworks, see Jeremy G. Epstein, The Laches
Defense in Art Theft Litigation, 4 IFAR J. 44 (2001); Alexandra Minkovich, The
Successful Use of Laches in World War IIEra Art Theft Disputes: It’s Only a
Matter of Time, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 349, 36174 (2004) (describing the
requirements necessary to satisfy a laches defense and the application of laches
to World War IIera art theft cases).
30. Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947) (citing Rosenman v. United
States, 323 U.S. 658, 661 (1945).
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of outcome, regardless of the merits of the claim, is exactly
their objective.31 The mechanism is dictated and justified by
the presumption that beyond a certain time, claims
inevitably grow stale. Therefore, the periods prescribed are
not totally unfounded, as they bear a rough relation to the
times for which reliable evidence for the respective causes of
action may be expected to endure.32 In short, the rationale
behind the statutes of limitations is presumed staleness.33
The equitable defense of laches is fundamentally
different in that the mere passage of time is not the sole
determining factor.34 As an equitable defense, laches
requires proof of actual staleness, consisting in a loss of
evidence,35 material and detrimental changes in the position
of the defendant,36 or other circumstances that would lead to
31. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (“[Statutes of
limitation] are, by definition, arbitrary, and their operation does not
discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable and
unavoidable delay. They have come into the law not through the judicial
process, but through legislation.”); Douglas v. Hugh A. Stallings, M.D., Inc., 870
F.2d 1242, 1248 (7th Cir. 1989) (“In general, statutes of limitations provide a
desired order and finality to the litigious process by way of an albeit arbitrary,
but bright line.”); Carter v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 764 F.2d
854, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1985). But cf. Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 18, at 505
(arguing against the finality imposed by statutes of limitation).
32. Note, supra note 17, at 118586.
33. Charles D. Webb, Jr., Whose Art is It Anyway? Title Disputes and
Resolutions in Art Theft Cases, 79 KY. L.J. 883, 884 (1991).
34. In Galliher v. Cadwell, the Supreme Court held:
The question of laches turns, not simply upon the number of years
which have elapsed between the accruing of her rights, whatever they
were, and her assertion of them, but also upon the nature and evidence
of those rights, the changes in value, and other circumstances occurring
during the lapse of years.
Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 37172 (1892); see also Kamat v. Kurtha, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107102, at *1516 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2008) (citation omitted)
(“[T]he exact duration of delay is not the determining factor in establishing
laches.”); Note, supra note 17, at 1184.
35. Robins Island Pres. Fund v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 424 (2d
Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is impossible for [the defendant] to obtain witnesses or marshal
evidence to support its contentions . . . .”).
36. See, e.g., id. (“A defendant may suffer prejudice . . . because it would be
inequitable, in light of a change in defendant’s position, to allow plaintiff’s claim
to proceed . . . .”); see also TriStar Pictures, Inc. v. Unger, 14 F. Supp. 2d 339,
361 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); O’Dette v. Guzzardi, 611 N.Y.S.2d 296 (App. Div. 1994)

2011]

HAS THE TIME (OF LACHES) COME?

629

special harm37 if the relief sought by the claimant was
granted.38 “Unlike statutory limitations, which are
legislatively created and mechanically applied in the courts
of law, the doctrine of laches originated outside this
statutory purview, as a matter of grace, rather than of right,
before the courts of equity . . . .”39 As an equitable defense,
laches takes into account not only the time that objectively
lapsed, but also subjective factors: 1) the reasonableness of
the claimant’s delay, and 2) the harm or prejudice actually
suffered by the defendant due to the plaintiff’s languor.40 As
such, the doctrine of laches involves a multifactor
balancing of all the equities, including the owner’s diligence,
the purchaser’s behavior, and the prejudice brought about.41
(citations omitted); 269 Assocs. v. Yerkes, 449 N.Y.S.2d 593, 597 (Civ. Ct. 1982)
(“Laches does not involve a mere matter of time, but principally involves a
question of the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being
founded on some change in the position or relationship of the parties.”).
37. The harm required for laches is not limited to mere economic harm. See,
e.g., Klein v. Gutman, 784 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (App. Div. 2004) (citation omitted);
Glenesk v. Guidance Realty Corp., 321 N.Y.S.2d 685, 688 (App. Div. 1971)
(citation omitted) (“[Harm includes] injury, change of position, intervention of
equities, loss of evidence, or other disadvantage resulting from such delay”); see
also Lerner, supra note 23, at 28; Minkovich, supra note 29, at 362.
38. In Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, the appellate division
explained:
When this potentiality for staleness becomes an actuality because of
the plaintiff’s inexcusable delay in acquainting himself with the facts
that would enable him to perform the requisite act, an appeal can be
made to the conscience of the court to dismiss the action as untimely,
notwithstanding that it was commenced within the statutory period.
Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (App. Div.
1990), aff’d, 559 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991); see also Republic of Turkey v. Metro.
Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citation omitted); Hawkins
et al., supra note 19, at 6768; Robinson, supra note 29, at 97172.
39. Ibrahim, supra note 28, at 647; see also Robinson, supra note 29, at 970.
40. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d
38 F.3d 1266 (1994); see also Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 60; Kelly Diane
Walton, Leave No Stone Unturned: The Search for Art Stolen by the Nazis and
the Legal Rules Governing Restitution of Stolen Art, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 549, 580, 591 (1999); Collins, supra note 19, at 133;
Minkovich, supra note 29, at 361; Elisa B. Pollack, Note, Toward a New
Standard in Art Recovery Cases: New York’s Solomon R. Guggenheim
Foundation v. Lubell and the Rejection of Due Diligence, 16 COLUM.VLA J.L. &
ARTS 361, 373 (1992).
41. Bibas, supra note 23, at 2446.
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Deciding a laches claim calls for a “factintensive inquiry
into the conduct and background of both parties in order to
determine the relative equities.”42 Accordingly, laches may
mitigate the harsh, mechanical effect of statutory limitation
when current possessors have been prejudiced by
dispossessed owners who “slumbered on their rights.”43 In
short, the difference between both timebased affirmative
defenses44 “can be traced to a tension between the
predictability of the legislatively defined time periods found
in statutes of limitations and the traditional flexibility and
discretion of the equity court resulting from individual
determinations of each case.”45
In view of the aforementioned timelessness of artwork,
and the impact thereof on the resulting restitution lawsuits,
these concepts of statutory limitation and laches recur. In
Flamenbaum, for instance, the theft of the artifact occurred
at the end of World War II. Not surprisingly, the defendant
argued that the museum’s claim in replevin was time
barred, either by the statute of limitations, or by the
doctrine of laches. The Surrogate’s Court eventually sided
with Hannah Flamenbaum, who, as the executor of her
father’s estate, had come across the golden amulet among
his assets. Although the museum had brought its action
within the limitation period, the court still denied the claim
on laches grounds.46
This Article has a twofold purpose. Part I will examine
the current twostep approach for the assessment of the
timeliness of replevin and conversion actions involving
stolen cultural property. This approach had only recently
taken shape in the New York forum in the mid1990s,
around the time of the modern upsurge in Holocaustrelated
42. United States v. Portrait of Wally, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, at *70
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2002) (citations omitted); see also Solomon R. Guggenheim
Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991), aff’g 550 N.Y.S.2d 618 (App.
Div. 1990).
43. Minkovich, supra note 29, at 361; Collins, supra note 19, at 133.
44. Statutory limitation is also an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Grosz v.
Museum of Modern Art, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6,
2010) (“The lapse of a limitations period is an affirmative defense that a
defendant must plead and prove.”).
45. Robinson, supra note 29, at 977.
46. In re Flamenbaum, 899 N.Y.S.2d 546, 554 (Sur. Ct. 2010).
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title disputes. According to Guggenheim v. Lubell, New York
law requires the courts first to apply a “demand and
refusal” rule in order to determine the time of accrual for
limitation purposes, after which the original owner’s
diligence in tracing his property is to be given consideration
under the doctrine of laches. More specifically, Part I will
present the distinctive features of the law of replevin and
conversion in the New York forum. First, it will describe
how statutory limitation constitutes a notable exception to
the nemo dat rule, by allowing the passage of time to affect
the allocation of rights and burdens between original
owners and possessors of stolen chattels. Second, it will
review New York’s unique position with regard to the
limitation of actions in replevin by analyzing the “demand
and refusal” rule, which determines the time of accrual of
the original owner’s cause of action. Third, it will explore
the corollary diligence requirement and the laches doctrine
introduced by New York courts to soften the inconsistencies
of “demand and refusal.” Part I concludes by showing that
since Guggenheim v. Lubell, New York courts have applied
a twofold mechanism of the “demand and refusal” rule in
combination with laches to assess the timeliness of actions
in replevin.
Part II’s purpose is to call attention to the court’s
increasing receptiveness to the limitation and laches
defenses in stolen art litigation in general, and Holocaust
related title disputes in particular. Based on a
comprehensive survey of all publicly available case law of
the past fifteen years on the recovery of stolen art in the
New York forum, this Part traces a number of recent
developments that demonstrate a shift: courts are
interpreting existing rules to provide significantly more
protection for a good faith purchaser, as opposed to New
York’s traditional policy of favoring the original owner. The
analysis concludes that it will be increasingly difficult, to
the point of impossibility, for heirs of Holocaust victims to
prevail in attempts to recover looted artwork.
I. “DEMAND & REFUSAL” AND LACHES:
REPLEVIN AND CONVERSION IN THE NEW YORK FORUM
At common law, a theft victim is well protected. Indeed,
unlike most civil law countries, good faith purchase is in
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itself not an effective defense against the original owner’s
claims for conversion or replevin.47 Because a thief’s title is
void, it is impossible for him to transfer good title to any
purchaser, either directly or indirectly through a chain of
subsequent purchasers. Throughout, title remains vested in
the original owner,48 regardless of whether the purchaser
acquired the stolen object (artwork or any kind of personal
property) in good faith or for value.49 Accordingly, whoever
buys from a thief—directly or indirectly—remains at all
times exposed to the original owner’s claim.50 In legal
writing, the Latin tenet nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre
potest quam ipse haberet51 is traditionally used to express
the common law principle of upholding the original owner’s
rights.52 Statutory provisions in the Uniform Commercial
47. See Montagu, supra note 27, at 79; Steven F. Grover, Note, The Need for
CivilLaw Nations to Adopt Discovery Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A
Comparative Study, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1445 (1992).
48. In Basset v. Spofford, the New York Court of Appeals found:
By the larcenous taking of chattels the owner is not divested of his
property, and a transfer to a purchaser does not impair the right of the
true owner. A purchase of stolen goods either directly from the thief or
from any other person, although in the ordinary course of trade and in
good faith, will not give a title as against the owner. In the case of a
felonious taking of goods, the owner may follow and reclaim them
wherever he may find them.
Basset v. Spofford, 45 N.Y. 387, 391 (1871); see also Marilyn E. Phelan, Scope of
Due Diligence Investigation in Obtaining Title to Valuable Artwork, 23 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 631, 63334 (2000); Robert Schwartz, The Limits of the Law: A Call
for a New Attitude towards Artwork Stolen during World War II, 32 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 1, 4 (1998); Julia A. McCord, Note, The Strategic Targeting of
Diligence: A New Perspective on Stemming the Illicit Trade in Art, 70 IND. L.J.
985, 98990 (1995).
49. See United States v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 804,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2001); see also Montagu, supra note 27, at 79; Bibas,
supra note 23, at 2440.
50. Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities,
36 HOW. L.J. 17, 21 (1993); Phelan, supra note 48, at 63334; Petrovich, supra
note 21, at 1124.
51. DIG. 50.17.54 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 46) (4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 962)
(Momsen et al., eds. 1985) (“No one can transfer greater rights to someone else
than he possesses himself.”).
52. See LYNDEL V. PROTT & PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL
HERITAGE: MOVEMENT 397 (1989). However, it should be observed that, under
certain conditions, a good faith purchaser for value may obtain title from a seller
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Code,53 the Sale of Goods Act of 1979,54 and their
predecessors55 mark the central role of the nemo dat
doctrine in American and English property law.56
A. Statutory Limitation: The Exception to the Nemo Dat
Rule
In all common law jurisdictions, statutory limitation
constitutes a major exception to the traditional nemo dat
doctrine. The mechanism allows the passage of time to
affect the allocation of rights and burdens between
purchasers of stolen chattels and original owners.57 As
previously argued,58 with regard to stolen art litigation, the
expiration of the limitation period often is an obvious
affirmative defense to the original owner’s action in
replevin, because it is not unlikely for stolen artwork to
resurface several decades after it went missing.59
1. Statutory Limitation: A Combined Action of Term
and Accrual. In common law jurisdictions, the limitation
term for actions in replevin tends to be rather short. In the
United States it typically ranges from two to six years.60
with a merely voidable title. Id. at 397405. Similarly, under U.C.C. § 2403(2),
entrustment of possession of personal property to a merchant who deals in such
goods gives the latter the power to transfer the entruster’s rights to a good faith
purchaser in the ordinary course of business. See Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The
Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 377, 398 (1995); Grover, supra note 47, at 144648.
53. U.C.C. § 2403(1) (2007).
54. Sale of Goods Act, 1979, c. 54, § 21 (Eng.).
55. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, § 21 (Eng.); AN ACT TO MAKE
UNIFORM THE LAW OF THE SALES OF GOODS § 23, at 15 (Conference of Comm’rs on
Unif. State Laws, ed. 1906).
56. 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3
12, at 26568 (5th ed. 2002); see also Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws
Protecting Our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 63, 99 (1993); David A.
Thomas, Establishing Title to Stolen Artworks in the United States, 3 INT’L
TRADE & BUS. L. ANN. 253, 254 (1997); Grover, supra note 47, at 1445.
57. See Montagu, supra note 27, at 80; Schwartz, supra note 48, at 4.
58. See supra notes 16, 46, and accompanying text.
59. Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 50; Walton, supra note 40, at 579;
McCord, supra note 48, at 990.
60. Nearly all U.S. states have limitation periods for personal property claims
that range between two and six years. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c)
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Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the limitation term for
actions to reclaim personal property is six years.61 Yet,
knowing when the limitation period starts to run is as
important as determining the length of the applicable
limitation term.62 The postponement of the statutory
limitation’s starting point explains why in most
jurisdictions with a vibrant art market, in spite of relatively
short limitation terms, actions in replevin may still be
brought decades after the theft, such as with World War II
art looting. Legally speaking, the timeliness of an action
depends upon a combination of term and “accrual.”63 The
“accrual of the cause of action” refers to the moment when
all necessary elements of the cause of action are present and
accordingly determines when the crucial limitations
countdown begins.64
However, the notion of accrual introduces a complex
problem. Most often, legislation merely defines the
limitation period for claims in replevin, without specifying
the event that marks the accrual of the cause of action.65
The issue of accrual was mainly left for the courts to decide,

(West 2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12301(2) (LexisNexis 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.11(3)(i) (West 2002); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13205 (West 2003); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:141 (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(3) (MCKINNEY 2003); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (West 2002). But see LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 3492 (1994).
61. Limitation Act, 1980, c. 58, § 2 (Eng.). However, different limitation rules
apply to actions against a thief or regarding subsequent conversions that
occurred before the person from whom the chattel was stolen recovered
possession of it. See id. §§ 34; PROTT & O’KEEFE, supra note 52, at 419.
62. See Collins, supra note 19, at 130; Cuba, supra note 21, at 455; Petrovich,
supra note 21, at 1128.
63. Malveaux, supra note 19, at 86; Montagu, supra note 27, at 81; William
G. Crimmins, Note, Evolution of Illinois Tort Statutes of Limitation: Where Are
We Going and Why?, 53 CHIKENT L. REV. 673, 677; Foutty, supra note 18, at
1842; Hayworth, supra note 18, at 343; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 112829;
Note, supra note 17, at 1200.
64. Crimmins, supra note 63, at 677; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1129; Note,
supra note 17, at 1200.
65. See Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37
BUFF. L. REV. 119, 126 (1988); Montagu, supra note 27, at 81; Foutty, supra note
18, at 1841; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1129.
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which resulted in considerable dissension among U.S.
jurisdictions.66
2. The Doctrines of Adverse Possession and Fraudulent
Concealment. Until 1980, it was generally held that for
actions with regard to personal property, the limitation
period began to run upon the commission of the tortious
act.67 There was indeed a large degree of uniformity among
the U.S. jurisdictions in determining the time of accrual by
applying the rules on adverse possession to stolen chattels.68
Provided the other elements of adverse possession were
satisfied, the time of the wrongful taking marked the
accrual of such cause of action, irrespective of the owner’s
knowledge of the theft.69 However, retrieval of stolen
artwork is quite an undertaking. All too often, even the
66. See Kreder, supra note 27, at 199; Linda F. Pinkerton, Due Diligence in
Fine Art Transactions, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1990); Thomas, supra
note 56, at 256; Meghan A. Sherlock, Comment, A Combined Discovery Rule and
Demand and Refusal Rule for New York: The Need for Equitable Consistency in
International Cases of Recovery of Stolen Art and Cultural Property, 8 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 483, 487 (2000).
67. Thomas, supra note 56, at 256.
68. See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese, “Georgia on My Mind”—Reflections on
O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 27 (1989); Gerstenblith, supra
note 65, at 12; William F. Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 17 N.Y.U. L.Q.
REV. 44, 8084 (1939); Webb, supra note 33, at 88587; Collins, supra note 19, at
130; Cuba, supra note 21, at 45355. Adverse possession—as traditionally
stated—requires property to be possessed in an adverse, visible, open and
notorious way, under a claim of right or title (that is, hostile to the title of the
original owner), continuously and exclusively for the length of time required by
the jurisdiction’s applicable statute of limitations. All elements must be satisfied
in order to bar the original owner’s action in replevin. See generally Henry
Winthrop Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28 YALE L.J. 219,
21924 (1919); Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse
Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1123 (1985).
69. Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 78; Eisen, supra note 18, at 107576;
Hayworth, supra note 18, at 34748; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 114243; see
also Rabinof v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 830, 84143 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding
that defendant’s possession of a violin had not been hostile to the rights of the
original owner; consequently, all requirements of the adverse possession
doctrine were not met, title did not pass and the owner’s action in replevin was
not timebarred); O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 405 A.2d 840, 847 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979) (“[T]he property must be possessed for the required period in the
required manner. If one of the essential ingredients to adverse possession is
missing, the claim for the property is simply not barred.”); Reynolds v. Bagwell,
198 P.2d 215, 217 (Okla. 1948).
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most diligent owner is unable to ascertain the identity of
the thief or subsequent purchaser until after the limitation
period for adverse possession has long expired, and hence
legal action is futile.70 Indeed, because the doctrine of
adverse possession examines the actions of the adverse
possessor instead of the original owner, the latter’s diligence
in tracing his property is considered irrelevant.71
In these situations, the only feasible argument for the
original owner was fraudulent concealment, which would
lead to equitable estoppel.72 This equitable tolling
mechanism effectively delays accrual for the duration of the
fraudulent concealment and “prevents a wrongdoer, who
induces the injured party’s delay by fraud, from relying on
the statute of limitations as a defense.”73 Accordingly, the
70. Thomas, supra note 56, at 256; Walton, supra note 40, at 579.
71. Tarquin Preziosi, Note, Applying a Strict Discovery Rule to Art Stolen in
the Past, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 225, 234 (1997).
72. See Autocephalous GreekOrthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 288 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Under this doctrine,
a defendant who has by deceit or fraud prevented a potential plaintiff from
learning of a cause of action cannot take advantage of his wrongdoing by raising
the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiff’s action.”); Naftzger v. Am.
Numismatic Soc’y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 789 (Ct. App. 1996); Strasberg v.
Odyssey Group, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474, 479 (Ct. App. 1996) (“[W]here there
has been a fraudulent concealment of the facts the statute of limitations does
not commence to run until the aggrieved party discovers or ought to have
discovered the existence of the cause of action for conversion.”); see also John P.
Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. REV.
875, 897901 (1933); Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 127; Hayworth, supra note
18, at 34546; Emily J. Henson, Note, The Last Prisoners of War: Returning
World War II Art to Its Rightful Owners—Can Moral Obligations Be Translated
into Legal Duties?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 1103, 110304, 1110, 1139 (2002);
Petrovich, supra note 21, at 113031.
73. Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 127; see also Gen. Stencils, Inc. v.
Chiappa, 219 N.E.2d 169, 170 (N.Y. 1966). For a discussion of what conduct on
the part of the adverse possessor might constitute fraudulent concealment, see
Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 12731. See also Republic of Turkey v. OKS
Partners, 797 F. Supp. 64, 69 (D. Mass. 1992); Autocephalous GreekOrthodox
Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374,
1392 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (applying a different accrual theory (the discovery rule)
and rendering an alternative finding that the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment could also be applicable); cf. CloseBarzin v. Christie’s, Inc., 857
N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that equitable estoppel did not
apply because the plaintiff possessed all the facts necessary to make a claim
within the limitations period).
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limitation period will not start to run until the thief or bad
faith purchaser starts to hold the property openly or
transfers it to an innocent purchaser.74
However, complications arise when the courts need to
apply the traditional doctrine of adverse possession to stolen
personal property, as this doctrine was designed to fit the
theft of land.75 The doctrine’s extrapolation to cover smaller,
easily movable, and concealable objects is problematic
because the ordinary (that is “open and notorious”76) usage
of such chattels would almost never put the original owner
on notice.77 Especially with regard to artwork, fraudulent
concealment tends to be virtually indistinguishable from
open, bona fide possession, as private and inconspicuous
possession of artwork necessarily involves some
concealment.78 However,79 a mere failure to publicly show
74. Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1131 n.36.
75. Dawson, supra note 72, at 898901; Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 128
Bibas, supra note 23, at 2437; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1143.
76. See supra note 68.
77. Franzese, supra note 68, at 7; Bibas, supra note 23, at 2441; Petrovich,
supra note 21, at 1144.
78. In O’Keeffe v. Snyder, the Supreme Court of New Jersey strikingly held
that:
The acquisition of title to real and personal property by adverse
possession is based on the expiration of a statute of limitations.
To establish title by adverse possession to chattels, the rule of law has
been that the possession must be hostile, actual, visible, exclusive, and
continuous.
...
. . . [T]here is an inherent problem with many kinds of personal
property that will raise questions whether their possession has been
open, visible, and notorious.
. . . For example, if jewelry is stolen from a municipality in one county
in New Jersey, it is unlikely that the owner would learn that someone
is openly wearing that jewelry in another county or even in the same
municipality. Open and visible possession of personal property, such as
jewelry, may not be sufficient to put the original owner on actual or
constructive notice of the identity of the possessor.
The problem is even more acute with works of art. Like many kinds of
personal property, works of art are readily moved and easily concealed.
O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 87071 (N.J. 1980); see also PROTT & O’KEEFE,
supra note 52, at 422; Eisen, supra note 18, at 107778.
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one’s artwork generally does not amount to fraudulent
concealment, as the doctrine requires some affirmative
fraudulent act: an active and intentional concealment of
both the location and identity of the possessor.80
Perhaps because of the equivocation arising from these
complications, numerous U.S. jurisdictions abandoned the
traditional adverse possession rule when dealing with
possessory rights over movable and easily concealable
objects such as artwork.81 In order to mitigate the
unjustifiably harsh effects that may result from imposing a
limitation period that starts to run upon the wrongful
taking, the courts have devised different triggering events
and ways of applying the statute of limitations.82
B. Accrual in the New York Forum: The “Demand and
Refusal” Rule
A considerable number of states, including California,
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio and
Pennsylvania, have substituted the traditional rule of
instant accrual (upon a wrongful taking) with the now
widespread discovery rule.83 However, New York courts take
a special position with regard to the limitation of actions in
replevin and adhere to a clearly distinct accrual doctrine:
the “demand and refusal” rule. Given New York’s role as the
center of the international art trade, this unique accrual
79. Cuba, supra note 21, at 454; Eisen, supra note 18, at 1078. See also
Hayworth, supra note 18, at 348 (pointing out that the doctrine of adverse
possession “creates an almost impossible burden: either the true owner must
locate the stolen property or the subsequent possessor must somehow meet the
vague requirement of ‘open and notorious’ possession”). But see Petrovich, supra
note 21, at 114647 (“the [O’Keefe] standard of openness . . . glosses over the
undeniable fact that not all works of all artists—even many works of
considerable value—merit museum display.”).
80. Dawson, supra note 72, at 898901; Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 79;
Henson, supra note 72, at 1139; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1131 n.36.
81. Bibas, supra note 23, at 2444; Cuba, supra note 21, at 45455; Sherlock,
supra note 66, at 488.
82. Franzese, supra note 68, at 7; Walton, supra note 40, at 579.
83. Bert Demarsin, The Third Time is Not Always a Charm: The Troublesome
Legacy of a Dutch Art Dealer—The Limitation and Act of State Defenses in
Looted Art Cases, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 255, 26472 (2010); see also
Thomas, supra note 58, at 258.
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doctrine for the law of replevin and conversion is very
influential.
1. “Demand and Refusal” as Substantive Prerequisites.
In Menzel v. List,84 the New York courts applied the
“demand and refusal” rule to measure the accrual time of an
action in replevin regarding a Chagall gouache that was
confiscated during the Holocaust.85 The New York Supreme
Court held that List’s limitation defense failed, as it was
wellsettled in New York law that “[i]n replevin, as well as
in conversion, the cause of action against a person who
lawfully comes by a chattel arises, not upon the stealing or
the taking, but upon the defendant’s refusal to convey the
chattel upon demand.”86 Originally, the “demand and
refusal” rule was developed to protect bona fide purchasers
from being sued for conversion prior to committing a
knowingly illicit act.87 It is upon the refusal of an original
owner’s demand for return that the tort actions for
conversion or replevin lie.88
84. Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 1964), modified on other
grounds, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), modification rev’d, 246 N.E.2d 742
(N.Y. 1969).
85. 267 N.Y.S.2d at 809. The dispute in Menzel involved a gouache by
Chagall that the plaintiff had left behind in her Brussels apartment when she
and her husband fled to escape imminent Nazi persecution in 1941. Id. at 806.
The Menzel family managed to escape to the United States, but the Nazis
confiscated the gouache. Id. Once the war was over, they tried to trace their
stolen Chagall, yet its whereabouts remained unknown until 1955. Id. at 807. At
that time the work resurfaced on the Parisian market, where a New York dealer
bought it and subsequently sold it to an admittedly good faith purchaser, Albert
List. Id. It was not until November 1962, when Mrs. Menzel noticed a
reproduction of the work in an art book, that she located the gouache in List’s
possession, whereupon she demanded its return. Id. When List refused to turn
over the gouache, Mrs. Menzel filed an action in replevin. Id.
86. Id. at 809 (citing Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28 (1874); Cohen v. Keizer, 285
N.Y.S. 488 (App. Div. 1936)). However, the “demand and refusal” requirement
did not affect the tolling of the limitation period in any of these cases.
87. See Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 6972 (analyzing in detail the
development of the rule from the time of Gillet until Menzel).
88. In State v. Seventh Regiment Fund, Inc., a case regarding converted
military artifacts, the New York Court of Appeals held:
[C]ourts from an early date have protected unsuspecting defendants by
requiring plaintiffs, under some circumstances, to show that they
demanded the goods and were refused. In this way, a bona fide
purchaser who performs no wrongful act relative to a plaintiff’s goods is
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Accordingly, by immunizing the innocent possessor from
sudden civil and criminal liability for unintentional takings,
the “demand and refusal” rule shields the good faith
possessor from unnecessary litigation and at the same time
stimulates private dispute resolution.89 However, New York
courts argued that when the converter took possession with
knowledge of the tortious character of his actions, the
conversion occurred at the time of the taking, not at the
time of the subsequent demand for return.90 Consequently,
against a thief or purchaser in bad faith, the cause of action
arises at once and no demand is necessary before initiating
a lawsuit in conversion or replevin.91
However, in spite of the “demand and refusal” rule’s
policy of protecting innocent purchasers, the Menzel court’s
decision arguably falls in favor of the original owner:
[W]ith respect to a bona fide purchaser of personal property a
demand by the rightful owner is a substantive, rather than a
procedural prerequisite to the bringing of an action. If that be so,
then the statute of limitations did not begin to run until demand
92
and refusal.

ensured “an opportunity to deliver the property to the true owner,
before he shall be made liable as a tort feasor [sic] for a wrongful
conversion.”
State v. Seventh Regiment Fund, Inc. 774 N.E.2d 702, 711 (N.Y. 2002) (quoting
Gillet, 57 N.Y. at 34) (citing Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569
N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991)); see also Schwartz, supra note 48, at 7; Bibas, supra
note 23, at 2445; Collins, supra note 19, at 133; Sydney M. Drum, Comment,
DeWeerth v. Baldinger: Making New York a Haven for Stolen Art?, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 909, 916 (1989).
89. Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 13435; Bibas, supra note 23, at 2445.
90. Seventh Regiment Fund, 774 N.E.2d at 711.
91. Id. at 711 (citations omitted) (“Naturally, if demand would be futile
because the circumstances show that the defendant knows it has no right to the
goods, demand is not required. One such circumstance, of course, arises when
the defendant is a thief.”); see also CutlerHammer, Inc. v. Troy, 126 N.Y.S.2d
452, 454 (App. Div. 1953); Del Piccolo v. Newburger, 9 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (App.
Div. 1939); N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. N.Y. Historical Soc’y, 635 N.Y.S.2d 998,
1000 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (illustrating how the taking of property without right
constitutes an instant conversion, without demand and refusal being necessary
to render the possessor liable); Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 70; Thomas,
supra note 58, at 258.
92. Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (App. Div. 1964) (citations omitted).
More recently, the New York Court of Appeals reiterated that the demand
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By considering “demand and refusal” as a substantive
element of the torts of replevin and conversion, the Menzel
court effectively postponed the time of accrual of the cause
of action from the moment of the theft until the moment of
refusal by the current possessor.93 Originally, the “demand
and refusal” rule merely affected the perpetration of a
tortious infraction with respect to an innocent possessor,
without bearing any consequences on the running of the
limitation period.94 Instead, the court ordered that the
Chagall be returned to Menzel,95 thereby adopting
somewhat questionable reasoning: “if the innocent
purchaser could not be sued until demand and refusal had
been made, then the former owner could sue within three
years of refusal, regardless of the passage of time from the
taking of the property until the demand.”96 In this way, the
requirement is substantive, rather than procedural. See Seventh Regiment
Fund, 774 N.E.2d at 711 n.7; Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 43031; see also
Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 72; Eisen, supra note 18, at 107980
(commenting on the difference between a procedural and a substantive
prerequisite). It is noteworthy that the Connecticut Supreme Court did not
consider the demand a substantive requirement for a replevin action, as the
court held that demand was not an element of a replevin case, but purely a
protection for the innocent possessor. Atlas Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 183 A. 690, 693
(Conn. 1936); see also Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1138 (commenting on the
Atlas case and the true nature of the demand prerequisite).
93. Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966); see also
Gerstenblith, supra note 51, at 135; Montagu, supra note 27, at 84; Drum, supra
note 88, at 918; Eisen, supra note 18, at 1080.
94. See Gillet, 57 N.Y. at 33; Cohen v. Keizer, 285 N.Y.S. 488 (App. Div.
1936). However, in Duryea v. Andrews, 12 N.Y.S. 42 (Sup. Ct. 1890), a New York
case about a stolen horse, the court seemed to relate the “demand and refusal”
rule to the running of the limitation period. The court held that the statute of
limitations did not start to run until demand was made. Id. Unfortunately, the
opinion is rather vague about the good faith of the possessor, and it lacks
citations. Cf. Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 70. Nevertheless, Duryea v.
Andrews had some influence, as the Kansas Court of Appeals cited it in Daniel
v. McLucas. See Daniel v. McLucas, 55 P. 680, 680 (Kan. Ct. App. 1899) (citing
Duryea, 12 N.Y.S. at 42) (holding that demand and refusal were prerequisites
for tolling the statute of limitations). But see Christensen Grain, Inc. v. Garden
City Coop., Equity Exch., 391 P.2d 81, 85 (Kan. 1964) (overruling Daniel v.
McLucas as being an incorrect statement of the law of accrual and holding that
the demand requirement does not create an exception to the statute of
limitations).
95. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
96. Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 6364.
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Menzel court established a precedent for determining
accrual and triggering the running of the limitation period
for actions in replevin.
2. Inconsistencies in the System of “Demand and
Refusal.” Although the “demand and refusal” rule allows
original owners to overcome the difficulties associated with
the doctrine of adverse possession, the New York accrual
theory has nonetheless been severely criticized.97 The
criticism stems from the corrupted interpretation of the
“demand and refusal” rule, which transformed a protective
measure for bona fide purchasers into a mechanism of
favoring the original owners of converted chattels.98 Worse
still, the manner in which the Menzel court applied the
“demand and refusal” rule as an ownerfriendly accrual
theory not only subverts the rationale of the demand
requirement (that is, safeguarding innocent purchasers
against sudden civil and criminal liability for unintentional
possession of converted goods),99 but may serve to entrap the
innocent purchaser altogether.
The effect of the Menzel decision was significant. An
innocent purchaser’s peace of mind was no longer a priority.
After all, aggrieved owners were allowed to bring causes of
action irrespective of the passage of the statute of
limitations’ designated time bar, provided that they have
satisfied the demand prerequisite.100 So in late sixties New
York, title to artwork could no longer be conveyed with
97. Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 135; Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 69
75; Eisen, supra note 18, at 108081; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 113740; see
also Nicholas D. Ward, The Georgia Grind Can the Common Law Accommodate
the Problems of Title in the Art World, Observations on a Recent Case, 8 J.C. &
U.L. 533, 554 (1982); Foutty, supra note 18, at 1846.
98. See, e.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 135; Foutty, supra note 18, at
1846.
99. In Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc. the Indiana Supreme Court explained in
simple terms the rationale behind the “demand and refusal” rule:
This rule is based on the presumption which the law indulges that one
who has lawfully come into possession of property which he is not
entitled to retain will, upon demand, surrender it to the person entitled
thereto and that he ought to be afforded an opportunity so to do
without being subjected to the inconvenience and expense of a law suit.
Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc., 46 N.E.2d 243, 244 (Ind. 1943).
100. Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 138; Bibas, supra note 23, at 2445; Eisen,
supra note 18, at 1080; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1140.
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certainty, regardless of the length of time for which solid
provenance could be established.101 Accordingly, incentives
for a purchaser to verify the provenance of prospective
purchases were effectively eliminated, because any extra
effort he invested in diligence and scrutiny prior to
purchase would be irrelevant if a challenge by an original
owner later arose.
Worse still, some commentators point out that the
demand requirement, when used as an accrual theory, leads
to absurd results because it may actually reward bad
faith.102 In Harpending v. Meyer, an action in conversion
against a good faith purchaser of converted jewels, the
California Supreme Court phrased their argument sharply:
[T]he operation of a rule which exempts a bona fide purchaser
from being sued until after demand made, is, in all the cases to
which it has been applied, favorable to the bona fide purchaser,
and it is claimed to have been devised for his protection. If applied
to this case, its operation is exactly the reverse of that. To hold
that the statute did not commence running in favor of these
defendants from the time of the delivery of the goods to them,
because of that time they were conscious of no wrongdoing,
which, if they had been conscious of, would have set the statute in
motion in their favor, involves an absurdity. . . . We are unwilling
to give a conscious wrongdoer any advantage over a constructive
103
wrongdoer.

101. Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 140.
102. Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 13839; Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at
66; Thomas, supra note 58, at 258; Eisen, supra note 18, at 108081; Petrovich,
supra note 21, at 1139.
103. Harpending v. Meyer, 55 Cal. 555, 561 (1880). While referring to the
“demand and refusal” rule, the New York Court of Appeals observed in State v.
Seventh Regiment Fund, Inc.:
This leads to the circumstance that we described as “anomalous” in
Lubell: an owner who belatedly discovers the theft of a possession
would rather sue a bona fide purchaser—against whom the conversion
cause of action accrues upon demand and refusal—than a thief, against
whom demand would be futile, and the claim accrues at once.
State v. Seventh Regiment Fund, Inc. 774 N.E.2d 702, 712 (N.Y. 2002) (citing
Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991)); see
also Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage Warehouse, Inc., No. 10557500,
2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 693, at *15 (Sup. Ct. 2001), aff’d 300 A.D.2d 117 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002).

644

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

Practically speaking, under the Menzel court’s “demand
and refusal” rule, an innocent purchaser might never
acquire certainty of title by way of the expiration of a
limitation period. Conversely, the limitation period is
triggered from the time of the taking for a conscious
convertor, who may acquire title with certainty after the set
limitation period.104 The thief and bad faith possessor would
find repose after only a few years, while the demand
requirement would eliminate limitation period protections
to the detriment of innocent purchasers, as owners may
postpone their demand indefinitely.105
Given these anomalies, some subsequent New York
cases have questioned the inequitable way in which Menzel
transformed the “demand and refusal” rule into an accrual
104. This was precisely the thrust of the defendant’s argument in
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon:
Elicofon contends that the Menzel rule should be abandoned because it
favors a thief as against a bona fide purchaser, since for a thief the
statute of limitations begins to run immediately upon the theft while a
bona fide purchaser must wait, possibly indefinitely, for a demand from
the owner. Insofar as a bad faith purchaser is treated as a thief for the
purposes of the statute of limitations, Elicofon contends that the bad
faith purchaser is also preferred by the Menzel rule to the good faith
purchaser. This, he argues, is anomalous, since the demand rule, whose
original rationale was to ensure that the innocent purchaser would be
informed of his defect in title before being made liable as a tortfeasor is
intended for the benefit of the innocent purchaser.
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1163 (2d Cir. 1982)
(citation omitted). It should be noted that there exist some balancing factors,
such as the doctrines of fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel, which
will often prevent purchasers in bad faith and thieves from benefitting from the
limitation defense. See Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 139 n.61. For more on the
anomaly inherent to the “demand and refusal” rule and the potential meaning of
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, leading to equitable estoppel, see infra
notes 26789 and accompanying text.
105. See Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 13839; Bibas, supra note 23, at 2445
46; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1139. In DeWeerth v. Baldinger, the Second
Circuit phrased the argument in a very clear manner, when it stated:
The rule may disadvantage the goodfaith purchaser, however, if
demand can be indefinitely postponed. For, if demand is delayed, then
so is accrual of the cause of action, and the goodfaith purchaser will
remain exposed to suit long after an action against a thief or even other
innocent parties would be timebarred.
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1987).
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mechanism. In StroganoffScherbatoff v. Weldon,106 a 1976
case regarding artwork taken from Russian aristocrats in
the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution, the defendant
raised the obvious limitation defense.107 After all, more than
fifty years had passed since the alleged misappropriation.
Unfortunately, the court found for the defendant on other
grounds, and the ruling deals primarily with the act of state
doctrine.108 However, in dictum, the district court
commented on limitation issues by stating that the action in
conversion was untimely, and drew attention to statutory
language evidently overlooked in the Menzel case.109
According to the Stroganoff court, section 206(a) of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) is relevant when
considering the impact of the demand prerequisite on the
tolling of the statute of limitations.110 The district court held:
Under New York CPLR § 206(a), a demand is necessary before a
person is entitled to bring an action in conversion. That statute
provides in part: “[W]here a demand is necessary to entitle a
person to commence an action, the time within which the action
must be commenced shall be computed from the time when the
111
right to make the demand is complete.”

With respect to determining when the right to make the
demand should be considered complete, New York courts
have repeatedly argued for the moment at which the alleged
wrongful act occurs. In Federal Insurance Co. v. Fries, for
example, the court stated:
In short, the statute of limitations runs, not from the demand,
but from the time when the [original owner] was entitled to make
106. 420 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
107. In the early 1920s, the Soviets nationalized the art collection of Count
Alexander SergevitchStroganoff. Id. at 21. The majority of the artwork was sold
at a Berlin auction in 1931, including a portrait by Anthony van Dyck and
Houdon’s bust of Diderot. Id. at 20. In 1931, the portrait was sold to a London
dealer, who in turn sold it on to Weldon, a New York collector. Id. In 1974, a
New York collector donated the Diderot bust to the Metropolitan. Id.
108. See id. at 22.
109. See id. at 22 n.5; Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 137 n.56; Petrovich,
supra note 21, at 1136.
110. See Stroganoff, 420 F. Supp. at 22 n.5; Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at
71.
111. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 206(a) (MCKINNEY 2003) (emphasis added).
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the demand. Were the rule otherwise, a plaintiff might extend the
statute indefinitely, merely by postponing the making of a
demand.
Here the [original owner] was entitled to make demand on
December 12, 1967, the day [he] mistakenly gave the rings to
defendant. Of course, the [original owner] was ignorant until
August, 1969, of the facts which gave it the right to make a
demand. But ignorance does not stop the clock, unless the
112
defendant engages in fraudulent or misleading conduct . . . .

Under this approach, the original owner’s right to make
a demand existed as soon as the possessor exercised control
over the gouache in a way that was contrary to the former’s
proprietary rights, even if he was prevented from making
the demand by lack of knowledge of the possessor’s
identity.113
Despite the Stroganoff court’s astute eye and
sophisticated argument, the New York courts continued to
apply Menzel’s accrual theory in deciding actions in replevin
and conversion regarding personal property.114 However, the
ownerfriendly “demand and refusal” rule was soon softened
to some extent by applying due diligence and laches
doctrines.115
C. Adjustments to the “Demand and Refusal” Rule:
Inserting Due Diligence and Laches
1. Elicofon and DeWeerth: Inserting Due Diligence. In
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon116 a federal district
court was given the opportunity to reinterpret the “demand
and refusal” rule when it was asked to apply New York law
to an action in replevin regarding two looted Dürer
paintings.117 The defendant argued that the claim in
112. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Fries, 355 N.Y.S.2d 741, 74748 (Civ. Ct. 1974) (internal
citations omitted).
113. Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 71; Petrovich, supra note 21, at 1137.
114. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gumer, 464 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 1983); see also
Drum, supra note 88, at 918.
115. Bibas, supra note 23, at 2446.
116. 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
117. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 829. Until 1943, a pair of Dürer portraits was on
view at the Staatliche Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar, an art museum in
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replevin was timebarred, because the cause of action had
accrued at the time he bought the paintings in 1946.118 The
district court, however, rejected that line of reasoning. It
held instead that the limitation clock started ticking only
after the defendant had refused to honor the museum’s
demand to surrender the property, affirming that “the rule
applied in Menzel is the existing New York [accrual] rule.”119
Yet in applying the demand requirement, the court
differed on the interpretation of the “demand and refusal”
rule as formulated in Menzel. The parties disagreed on the
issue of whether the demand requirement vested a corollary
duty of care in the original owner to attempt to trace the
stolen property.120 The district court acknowledged that
Menzel had not dealt with this issue, but nonetheless left
the question unanswered on the basis that there was no
need to decide the issue given that “undisputed evidence
clearly demonstrate[d] that the [museum] made a diligent
Germany. Id. at 831. The portraits depicted Hans and Felicitas Tucher.
Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1152 n.1. When the military tide started to turn against
NaziGermany, the director of the Weimar museum anticipated the
bombardment of the city and had valuable items transferred to Schloss
Swartzburg, a nearby castle in what was to become East Germany. Elicofon, 536
F. Supp. at 831. The Dürer paintings were stashed in a storeroom within the
castle for safekeeping. Id. In July 1945, around the time that the American
troops that were quartered in the surroundings of the Schloss were replaced by
a more permanent regiment of the Red Army, the paintings were reported
stolen. Id. at 835. In 1966, they were discovered in the Brooklyn home of
Edward Elicofon, where the portraits had been openly displayed to friends since
the day he had purchased them from an American exsoldier, some twenty years
earlier. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 115253, 1156. The exserviceman seller claimed to
have bought them in Germany before returning to New York. Id. at 1156.
Satisfied with that statement, Elicofon purchased the portraits for $450. Id.
When the discovery of the looted paintings was published on the front page of
the New York Times, a demand for recovery from Germany was not long due. Id.
Yet Elicofon refused, and the East German museum filed suit. Id. at 1156. See
generally Kent L. Killelea, Property Law: International Stolen Art—
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982), 23
HARV. INT’L L.J. 466, 46769 (1983); Ostenberg, supra note 15, at 18486;
Henson, supra note 72, at 111415; Meredith Van Pelt, Comment,
Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc.: A Case for the Use of Civil Remedies in Effecting the Return of
Stolen Art, 8 DICK. J. INT’L L. 441, 455 (1990).
118. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 829, 832.
119. Id. at 849.
120. Id.
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although fruitless effort to locate the paintings.”121
Accordingly, there simply was no unreasonable delay in
making the demand.
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit could not side
step the issue. The court reverted to a strict interpretation
of the “demand and refusal” rule in Menzel and decided that
no corollary duty of care was part of the substantive
demand prerequisite in the State of New York.122 The court
firmly reiterated the rule:
As between the policy, urged by Elicofon, of allowing the statute of
limitations to run against an owner regardless of his ignorance,
and tolling it indefinitely against a good faith purchaser until a
demand is made, we are satisfied that New York has chosen the
latter course. We therefore hold that the cause of action accrued in
1966 and the statute of limitations did not begin to run until
123
then.

Nonetheless, the Second Circuit’s conclusions erred on
the side of caution: “[E]ven if New York had a reasonable
inquiry rule under which the statute of limitations begins to
run when the owner knew or should have known of the
stolen property’s location, the GDR exercised reasonable
diligence and cannot be held responsible for the late
discovery of the Duerer paintings.”124
With DeWeerth v. Baldinger,125 the Second Circuit was
given the opportunity to reconsider the purport of the
decision taken in Elicofon.126 The factual background of both
cases shows some remarkable similarity, as DeWeerth also
involved a painting that American servicemen allegedly
stole from a German castle at the end of World War II.127
121. Id. at 84950.
122. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 116364; see also Drum, supra note 88, at 924.
123. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 116364.
124. Id. at 1164 n.25.
125. 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), remanded,
804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (mem.) (granting relief from judgment).
126. Drum, supra note 88, at 923.
127. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105. In 1943, Gerda Dorothea DeWeerth, a
German citizen, entrusted a Monet painting to her sister for safekeeping in her
castle in Oberbalzheim, Southern Germany. Id. at 10405. Two years later,
shortly after the end of the war, American troops were billeted on the premises
of the castle. Id. at 105. However, in the fall of 1945, right after the soldiers had
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Again, it was not surprising that the defendant called upon
the statute of limitations or, alternatively, the doctrine of
laches as a defense.128 By openly denouncing DeWeerth’s
unreasonable delay in the commencement of the
proceedings, Baldinger strongly advocated the necessity of
modifying the “demand and refusal” rule to include a
corollary obligation on the part of the plaintiff to use due
diligence in tracing a stolen object, whether it be on a laches
or a statute of limitations basis.129 At trial, however, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York relied on Elicofon to rule in favor of DeWeerth.130
The court found DeWeerth’s action timely, as she had not
unreasonably delayed her demand for the return of the
painting.131 The court again sidestepped the due diligence
issue, by reducing all Baldinger’s affirmative defenses to
left, the painting went missing. Id. Upon learning about the theft, DeWeerth
took immediate steps to investigate and recover the painting. In 1946, she
reported the loss to the military government responsible for administrating the
area after World War II. Id. In 1948, she solicited the assistance of her lawyer to
attempt to locate and recover the work, and in 1955 she made inquiries to an art
expert. Id. Finally, in 1957, DeWeerth reported the Monet as missing to the
Bundeskriminalamt, the WestGerman Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id.
Unfortunately, none of these efforts were successful. Id. After more than a
decade of unfruitful attempts at recovery, Gerda DeWeerth suspended her
search efforts. Id. In the meantime, by December 1956, the Monet had found its
way to the United States. Id. A New York City gallery, Wildenstein & Co., had
acquired the painting from a Geneva art dealer. Id. In June 1957, Baldinger
purchased the painting for $30,900 from Wildenstein. Id. Although the Monet
figured at two public exhibitions in New York, and there had been four
published references to the picture, DeWeerth did not pick up the trail until
July 1981, when her nephew discovered the lost Monet in a 1974 Claude Monet:
Bibliographie et Catalogue Raisonné, Vol. 1 18401881. Id. The book mentioned
that the work had been exhibited in 1970 at Wildenstein’s. Id. When
Wildenstein refused to reveal the possessor’s identity or the Monet’s
whereabouts, DeWeerth filed suit against Wildenstein in New York Supreme
Court, seeking disclosure of the necessary information to bring an action in
replevin. Id. at 106. On December 1, 1982, the State Supreme Court ordered
Wildenstein to reveal the identity of the purchaser, Edith Baldinger. See
DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 692. By letter, DeWeerth immediately demanded
Baldinger to return the Monet. See id. When the latter refused to honor her
request, DeWeerth filed suit. Id.
128. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 693.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 694.
131. Id. at 69495.
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one core issue: whether DeWeerth’s delay in filing a claim
was unreasonable.132 According to the district court, there
was no real need to discuss a diligence requirement, since
DeWeerth’s diligence was undisputed.133 Under its
timeliness analysis, the court factored the individual
circumstances of DeWeerth into its decision and stressed
the fact that she was an elderly woman.134 After all, when
she made her last effort to trace the artwork in 1957,
DeWeerth was already sixtythree years old.135 In addition,
the court observed that the published references to the
Monet, which had ultimately led to the painting’s discovery,
were found in specialized art literature that was not
generally circulated.136 In this context, the district court
explicitly rejected any argument put forward to compare
DeWeerth’s efforts to those of the governmentowned art
museum in the Elicofon case.137 The plaintiffs in each case
clearly differed in resources, knowledge, and experience.138
Further, the court noted that for over ten years, DeWeerth
had shown considerable initiative to recover her property.139
Therefore, the district court concluded that, in spite of many
years of delay, DeWeerth’s fruitless efforts were substantial
enough to deny barring her action in replevin on grounds of
untimeliness.140
132. See Drum, supra note 88, at 927; Foutty, supra note 18, at 1849; Henson,
supra note 7, at 1119.
133. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 694 (“The court in Elicofon did not decide the
issue because ‘the undisputed evidence clearly demonstrate[d] that the
[plaintiff] made a diligent although fruitless effort to locate the paintings.’ The
same is true in this case.” (quoting Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon,
536 F. Supp. 829, 84950 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)) (internal citations omitted)).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 694; see also Drum, supra note 88, at 928 & n.159; Foutty,
supra note 18, at 1849 & n.98; Pollack, supra note 40, at 367.
136. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 694.
137. Id. at 69495.
138. Id. (“[A]ny comparison with Elicofon is inapposite. There the plaintiff was
a governmentowned art museum, with resources, knowledge and experience
that far exceeded any means an individual such as Mrs. DeWeerth could muster
to carry on a credible search for a missing painting.”).
139. See id. at 694.
140. See id. at 695; see also Drum, supra note 88, at 928; Foutty, supra note
18, at 1849; Henson, supra note 72, at 1120; Pollack, supra note 40, at 367.

2011]

HAS THE TIME (OF LACHES) COME?

651

Upon appeal, the Second Circuit reassessed DeWeerth’s
diligence and reversed the district court’s decision. The
appeal court stated that: “[w]here demand and refusal are
necessary to start a limitations period, the demand may not
be unreasonably delayed.”141 Accordingly, the Second Circuit
further developed the Elicofon and Menzel decisions to
insert a due diligence requirement into the “demand and
refusal” rule.142 The Second Circuit acknowledged that New
York courts had not previously applied such a requirement,
but found that it was justified for three important policy
considerations.143 First, the court recalled that New York
had a “policy of favoring the good faith purchaser” and of
discouraging stale claims.144 Second, the court indicated that
New York law needed to be made more harmonious with the
law in other jurisdictions. It explicitly noted that the owner
friendly “demand and refusal” rule was at odds with the
rules on accrual applicable in other states.145 Finally, the
court reasoned that the imposition of a due diligence
requirement would further the protection of defendants
from stale claims, the general policy promoted by any
statute of limitations.146 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit
refrained from formulating guidelines for determining the
amount of diligence required, and preferred to leave each
141. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1987); see also
Hawkins et al., supra note 7, at 7475; Walton, supra note 28, at 58990.
142. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 10608.
143. Id. at 107, 10910; see also Drum, supra note 72, at 93237 (thoroughly
analyzing these underlying policies).
144. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 10910.
145. While specifically referring to O’Keeffe, the Second Circuit reasoned:
Other jurisdictions have adopted limitations rules that encourage
property owners to search for their missing goods. In virtually every
state except New York, an action for conversion accrues when a good
faith purchaser acquires stolen property; demand and refusal are
unnecessary. . . . It is true that New York has chosen to depart from the
majority view. Nevertheless, the fact that plaintiff’s interpretation of
New York law would exaggerate its inconsistency with the law of other
jurisdictions weighs against adopting such a view. At least one other
state has recently confronted the limitations problem in the context of
stolen art and has imposed a duty of reasonable investigation.
Id. at 109 (citing O’Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980)) (citations
omitted).
146. Id. at 10810.
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matter to be assessed in accordance with “the circumstances
of the case.”147 The court consequently reevaluated
DeWeerth’s efforts to locate and recover her missing
painting and was persuaded by her inaction and deficiencies
in her initial search.148 According to the Second Circuit,
DeWeerth had failed to give more than minimal information
to the authorities and art experts, thus hindering the
probability of actual recovery.149 In addition, rather than a
real attempt to recover the artwork, the Second Circuit
considered her conversations with her lawyer more as an
insurance matter.150 The court in particular faulted her for
not having consulted the Monet Catalogue Raisonné earlier
than 1981, as in practice she had stopped all efforts to trace
the painting in 1957.151 Finally, the court found that she had
failed to take advantage of German or American programs
to trace the stolen Monet, despite the fact that her family
had used the system to recover other stolen art objects.152
The Second Circuit was severe, characterizing
DeWeerth’s efforts as minimal attempts for recovery that
could not be absolved by her elderly age, and holding that
“although an individual, DeWeerth appears to be a wealthy
and sophisticated art collector; even if she could not have
mounted a more extensive investigation herself, she could
have retained someone to do it for her.”153 Instead of
certifying the decision to the New York Court of Appeals,154
the Second Circuit articulated and applied a new standard,
purporting to establish, as a federal court deciding a

147. Id. at 110.
148. Foutty, supra note 18, at 1850.
149. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 111.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 112.
152. Id. at 11112; see also Webb, supra note 33, at 88990.
153. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 112.
154. Certification of a question to the New York Court of Appeals is the means
by which a federal court deciding New York law requests an answer or guidance
from a state’s highest court on a point of law that is unclear, yet crucial to
resolve the case. However, the Second Circuit did not certify the matter to the
New York Court of Appeals because it did not believe that the matter would
recur with sufficient frequency. Id. at 108 n.5; see also Hawkins et al., supra
note 19, at 74 n.152.
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diversity action, how New York law would be decided.155 Yet
shortly thereafter, it became clear that the Second Circuit
was mistaken.
2. Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell:
Inserting Laches. In Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v.
Lubell,156 the New York Court of Appeals stated that a
diligence rule corollary to the demand requirement was a
misunderstanding of New York law and renounced its
existence.157 In this case, the Guggenheim Foundation,
which operates the Guggenheim Museum in New York City,
sought to recover a 1912 gouache by Chagall.158 The work
had disappeared from the museum storage sometime in the
late 1960s and was worth an estimated $200,000.159 When in
1986 the foundation demanded that Rachel Lubell
surrender the work, the latter, being a bona fide purchaser,
155. Bibas, supra note 23, at 244647; Foutty, supra note 18, at 1850; Pollack,
supra note 40, at 367.
156. 550 N.Y.S.2d 618 (App. Div. 1990), aff’d, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
157. Id. at 42930; see also Bibas, supra note 23, at 2447.
158. Guggenheim, N.E.2d at 427. The Chagall gouache, known as Le
Marchand de Bestiaux, was donated to the Guggenheim in 1937. Id. at 428.
However, in the late 1960s the museum discovered that the work was not where
it was supposed to be. Id. It was not until the Guggenheim undertook the
decennial comprehensive inventory of the collection in 1969 that the museum
was able to conclude that the gouache had in fact been stolen, most likely by a
mailroom employee. Id. Believing that publicizing the theft would only drive the
gouache further underground, the Guggenheim tactically decided not to inform
other museums, galleries, or artistic organizations, and not to report the theft to
any law enforcement authority. Id. In 1974, the museum’s Board of Trustees,
who considered that all recovery efforts had been exhausted, voted to
“deaccession” the gouache and removed it from the museum’s records. Id. Yet by
that time, Le Marchand de Bestiaux was hanging in the house of Rachel Lubell
who, together with her late husband, had purchased the gouache in May 1967
from the Robert Elkon Gallery, a wellknown Madison Avenue dealer. Id. at
42728. The invoice and receipt indicated that the gouache had been in the
collection of a named individual, who later turned out to be the museum
mailroom employee suspected of the theft. Id. at 428. For more than twenty
years, the Lubells openly displayed the work at their home. Id. at 427. As they
had no reason to believe that the painting had been stolen, they twice agreed to
publicly exhibit the work, once in 1967 and again in 1981. Id. at 428. In 1985, a
private art dealer brought a transparency of the painting to Sotheby’s for an
auction estimate. Id. The Sotheby’s expert had previously worked at the
Guggenheim and recognized the gouache as the stolen piece. Id. The expert
notified the museum, which discovered that Lubell possessed the gouache. Id.
159. Id. at 427.
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refused.160 Soon thereafter, the foundation filed a lawsuit for
recovery.161 In court, Lubell argued that the action in
replevin was barred by the threeyear statute of limitations,
particularly in light of the museum’s lack of effort to locate
its property in the twentyyear interval between the theft
and its fortuitous discovery.162
The trial court found for the defendant, relying on the
logic of the Second Circuit’s decision in DeWeerth.163 It
applied the New York “demand and refusal” rule, yet
reasoned that “in order to avoid prejudice to a good faith
purchaser, demand [could not] be unreasonably delayed.”164
Because the museum had done little more in twenty years
than search its own premises, the trial court found that its
conduct was unreasonable as a matter of law and granted
Lubell’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
the museum’s cause of action was timebarred.165
The appellate division modified the trial decision,
holding that the trial court erred in concluding that “delay
alone can make a replevin action untimely when knowledge
is imputed.”166 The court thought “it plain that the relative
possessory rights of the parties cannot depend upon the
mere lapse of time, no matter how long.”167 The court
applied the demand requirement,168 yet added that bringing
an action upon demand and refusal within the limitation
period does not end the inquiry.169 It was also crucial to
determine “whether a reasonable diligent search could have
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 42829. Unfortunately, the trial court’s decision is unpublished, so
one must rely on the court of appeals, which repeats relevant parts of the trial
court decision.
164. Id. at 42829.
165. Id. at 428.
166. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (App.
Div. 1990).
167. Id. at 622.
168. Id. at 620 (“[A]bsent a demand there is no cause of action for replevin
against a goodfaith purchaser, and absent a cause of action, the statute cannot
begin to run.”).
169. Id. at 621; see also Henson, supra note 72, at 1124.
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enabled the plaintiff to make an earlier demand.”170
However, the appellate division also deviated from the
decision in DeWeerth, holding that:
[W]hether [the museum] was obligated to do more than it did in
searching for the gouache depends on whether it was
unreasonable not to do more, and whether it was unreasonable
not to do more is an issue of fact relevant to the defense of laches
and not the Statute of Limitations. The action, therefore, should
not have been dismissed as barred by the Statute of
171
Limitations.

According to the appellate division, Lubell’s lack of
diligence argument had more to do with laches than with
the statute of limitations. The court clarified its new
characterization, explaining that if such a defense were to
succeed, Lubell had to articulate prejudice in addition to
mere delay in demanding return of the gouache.172 With
regard to the requirement of prejudice, the court noted that
“rather than harming [Lubell], delay alone could be viewed
as having benefited her, in that it gave her that much more
time to enjoy what she otherwise would not have had.”173
The New York Court of Appeals, affirming the appellate
division, eliminated the corollary diligence requirement
earlier imposed by the Second Circuit in DeWeerth.174
Accordingly, the court reiterated a pure “demand and
refusal” rule to be the controlling law in New York.175 The

170. Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d. at 621.
171. Id. at 619.
172. Id. at 622 (“[W]e prefer to characterize the defense urged here—lack of
diligence in searching for stolen property . . . as laches. Indeed, we do so mainly
in order to point up that if such a defense is to be deemed meritorious, prejudice
must be articulated in addition to delay.”).
173. Id. at 622 (citing Marcus v. Village of Mamaroneck, 283 N.E.2d 856, 859
(N.Y. 1946)).
174. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y.
1991) (“We have reexamined the relevant New York case law and we conclude
that the Second Circuit should not have imposed a duty of reasonable diligence
on the owners of stolen art work for purposes of the Statute of Limitations.”).
175. See id. at 429 (“The rule in this State is that a cause of action for replevin
against the goodfaith purchaser of a stolen chattel accrues when the true owner
makes demand for return of the chattel and the person in possession of the
chattel refuses to return it. Until demand is made and refused, possession of the
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court stated that “there is no reason to obscure its
straightforward protection of true owners by creating a duty
of reasonable diligence.”176 The Court of Appeals referred to
two factors to explain why it extinguished the Second
Circuit’s diligence approach. First, the court believed that a
due diligence rule would easily become arbitrary by lack of
an objective standard,177 as it considered that:
The value of the property stolen, the manner in which it was
stolen, and the type of institution from which it was stolen will all
necessarily affect the manner in which a true owner will search
for missing property. We conclude that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to craft a reasonable diligence requirement that could
take into account all of these variables and that would not unduly
178
burden the true owner.

Second, the Court of Appeals argued that the “demand
and refusal” rule—though not the only possible method of
measuring the accrual of replevin—still affords the best
protection to true owners of stolen property. The court
recalled that “New York had already considered—and
rejected—adoption of a discovery rule.”179 The 1986
stolen property by the goodfaith purchaser for value is not considered
wrongful.”).
176. Id. at 430.
177. Id. at 43031. The court illustrated its point, as it held:
Here, the parties hotly contest whether publicizing the theft would
have turned up the gouache. According to the museum, some members
of the art community believe that publicizing a theft exposes gaps in
security and can lead to more thefts; the museum also argues that
publicity often pushes a missing painting further underground. In light
of the fact that members of the art community have apparently not
reached a consensus on the best way to retrieve stolen art, it would be
particularly inappropriate for this Court to spell out arbitrary rules of
conduct that all true owners of stolen art work would have to follow to
the letter if they wanted to preserve their right to pursue a cause of
action in replevin.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
178. Id. at 431.
179. Id. at 430. The court explained:
In 1986, both houses of the New York State Legislature passed
Assembly Bill 11462A (Senate Bill 3274B). . . . This bill provided that
the threeyear Statute of Limitations would run from the time [certain
notforprofit] institutions gave notice, in a manner specified by the
statute, that they were in possession of a particular object. Governor
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Assembly Bill 11462A would have substituted the
jurisprudential “demand and refusal” rule for a legislated
discovery rule for actions in replevin regarding art objects
possessed by certain notforprofit institutions. “In his veto
message, [Governor Cuomo] expressed his concern that the
statute [did] not provide a reasonable opportunity for
individuals or foreign governments to receive notice of a
museum’s acquisition and take action to recover it before
their rights are extinguished.”180 The Governor feared that
the bill, if it went into effect, “would have caused New York
to become a haven for cultural property stolen abroad since
such objects [would] be immune from recovery under the
limited time periods established by the bill.”181 With this
context in mind, the court felt strongly that placing the
diligence burden on the original owner would boost illegal
art trade in New York.182 Consequently, Guggenheim voided
the due diligence requirement imposed by DeWeerth on an
original owner seeking to defeat a statute of limitations
defense. Rather than shifting the burden onto the wronged
owner, it was better policy to give “the owner relatively
greater protection and place[s] the burden of investigating
the provenance of a work of art on the potential
purchaser.”183
As the appellate division had already suggested, the
New York Court of Appeals thought that the best way to
achieve this result was through the equitable defense of
laches. The court argued:
Despite our conclusion that the imposition of a reasonable
diligence requirement on the museum would be inappropriate for
purposes of the statute of limitations, our holding today should
not be seen as either sanctioning the museum’s conduct or
suggesting that the museum’s conduct is no longer an issue in this
Cuomo vetoed the measure, however, on advice of the United States
Department of State, the United States Department of Justice and the
United States Information Agency.
Id. (citing Irvin Molotski, 3 U.S. Agencies Urge Veto of ArtClaim Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 1986, at C15); see also Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 6263;
Drum, supra note 88, at 93536.
180. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 430 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Id. at 431.
183. Id.

658

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

case. We agree with the Appellate Division that the arguments
raised in the appellant’s summary judgment papers are directed
at the conscience of the court and its ability to bring equitable
considerations to bear in the ultimate disposition of the painting.
As noted above, although appellant’s Statute of Limitations
argument fails, her contention that the museum did not exercise
reasonable diligence in locating the painting will be considered by
184
the Trial Judge in the context of her laches defense.

By raising the equitable defense of laches, a bona fide
purchaser can mitigate the unfairness of the “demand and
refusal” rule. Laches calls for the evaluation of the conduct
of both the original owner and the purchaser,185 thus
allowing a possessor to keep the art object provided he can
show prejudice in addition to unreasonable delay.186 The
main effect of this equitable doctrine is to transfer the
burden of proof to the bona fide purchaser, requiring him to
show that the original owner had exerted unreasonably
little effort in tracing its stolen property.
3. Reinforcement of the Laches Approach. In the
immediate years after Guggenheim, the laches approach
became well established. In Republic of Turkey v.
Metropolitan Museum of Art,187 Turkey, which claimed
ownership of all antiquities found within its territory,
sought to recover several illegally excavated artifacts from
the Metropolitan.188 In spite of the museum’s attempt to
distinguish the case at bar from Guggenheim,189 the district
court found it applicable, holding that “the [museum’s]
claims of delay [went] solely to whether the defense of
laches [was] available and not to a defense based on the

184. Id.
185. Id; see also Walton, supra note 40, at 59293; Hayworth, supra note 18, at
37172.
186. See State v. Seventh Regiment Fund, Inc. 774 N.E.2d 702, 712 (N.Y.
2002).
187. 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The parties settled in 1993 when the
Metropolitan agreed to restitute several objects. See 1 RALPH E. LERNER &
JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW—THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS,
AND ARTISTS 276 (3d ed. 2005).
188. Id. at 45.
189. See Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. at 46; see also Hayworth,
supra note 18, at 373.
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statute of limitations.”190 Consequently, the court did not
require a showing of due diligence and disparaged
DeWeerth’s holdings as “creative.”191
Soon thereafter, in Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian
Land Co. of America, the Court of Appeal for the Second
Circuit also adopted Guggenheim’s laches approach.192 This
case revolved around an action in conversion, brought
against a U.S. corporation for allegedly hiding the proceeds
of the “Yamashita Treasure.”193 In 1971, an adventurer194
had unearthed the treasure195 in the Philippines. However,
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos seized the treasuretrove for
their own personal use and benefit, and entered into a
scheme with the Canadian Land Company of America to
convert the proceeds into property located in the United
States.196 Since it was possible that some defendants had
obtained parts of the treasure innocently, the Second
Circuit pointed out that the “demand and refusal” rule
applied.197 With regard to the issue of laches, the court
190. See Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. at 4647.
191. See id. at 45; see also Hans Kennon, Take a Picture, It May Last Longer if
Guggenheim Becomes the Law of the Land: The Repatriation of Fine Art, 8 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 373, 403 n.195 (1996); Preziosi, supra note 71, at 236.
192. 931 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1991).
193. Id. at 198. The court stated:
The provenance of the Yamashita Treasure is shrouded in
mystery. According to the complaint, it was hidden in [t]he
Philippines by the Japanese occupation forces prior to the end of
World War II and the fall of The Philippines in 1945 . . . . Although
appellees question whether the treasure ever existed, it is an
historical fact that Lieutenant General Yamashita . . . served as
Commander of Japanese forces in the Philippines during World
War II. General MacArthur accused Yamashita of sacking the City
of Manila and its shrines and monuments and urged his execution
as a war criminal.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. For procedural reasons, the adventurer assigned his rights in the
“Yamashita Treasure” to the Golden Budha Corporation, owned by a longtime
friend and having its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Id. at 199.
195. The treasure trove “was comprised of gold bullion, precious stones,
jewelry, works of art and coins, as well as a huge enigmatic golden buddha . . . .”
Id. at 198.
196. Id. at 199.
197. Id. at 201.
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referred to Guggenheim and repeated that “[w]here recovery
is sought from an innocent purchaser, no duty of reasonable
diligence is imposed under New York law upon the owner of
stolen property, although the owner’s laches may be taken
into account.”198
Likewise, in Hoelzer v. City of Stamford199 the Second
Circuit had another opportunity to implement what had
clearly become the law of the State of New York. Although
the case did not involve stolen art per se, it did address the
matter of when the statute of limitations should begin to
run on an owner’s claim in replevin.200 At trial, the district
court declared ownership of a set of murals in favor of the
City of Stamford.201 On appeal, Hoelzer contended that the
district court erred in its finding, as the city had
“unreasonably delayed its demand for return.”202 This time,
clearly apprised of the relevant New York law,203 the Second
Circuit found that the city’s repossession claim was not
affected by lack of diligence, as it held that “an owner need
not act with due diligence before demanding return of her
198. Id. (citing Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429
(N.Y. 1991)).
199. 722 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 933 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991),
modified, 972 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1992).
200. Id. at 113335; see also Pollack, supra note 40, at 37477. In 1971, the
General Services Administration (GSA) in Washington, D.C. delivered six large
mural paintings to Hoelzer to have them professionally restored. Hoelzer, 722 F.
Supp. at 1134. The murals by James Daugherty had hung on the walls of the
Stamford High School from 1934 until 1970, when they were inadvertently
discarded by construction workers during the renovation of the school. Id.
Fortunately, a student noticed the paintings resting close to the trash, rescued
them, and eventually turned them over to the GSA. Id. In the meantime, the
school had made several unsuccessful inquiries as to the location of the murals.
Id. In 1986, the GSA informed Hoelzer, yet uncompensated for his work, that
the murals belonged to the Stamford High School. Id. at 1135. When the school
asked for their return, Hoelzer indicated that he was willing to sell the murals,
as he claimed them to be his property, since the school had repudiated its rights
by abandoning them in 1970. Id. In an action seeking a declaratory judgment to
quiet title, Hoelzer contended that the statute of limitations for the city’s action
in replevin had run before it asserted ownership to the murals. Id.
201. Id. at 1114.
202. Hoelzer, 933 F.2d at 1135.
203. See id. at 1137 (citing Golden Budha, 931 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1991);
Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991); Republic of Turkey v. Metro. Museum
of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
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property.”204 Therefore, in spite of the city’s almost complete
inertia from 1970 until 1986, the cause of action only
accrued when the city made its first demand for return of
the murals, which Hoelzer refused.205 Although Hoelzer had
not explicitly asserted laches, the court nonetheless drew
attention to the relevance of the parties’ due diligence with
regard to that equitable doctrine, which the court qualified
as “sufficient[] [to] safeguard[] the interests of a good faith
purchaser.”206
A fourth application of the newborn laches approach
“involved a procedurally unusual postscript to DeWeerth v.
Baldinger.”207 Perplexed by the outcome of Guggenheim,
DeWeerth moved to vacate the decision of the Second
Circuit, which had awarded her Monet to Baldinger.208 In
204. Hoelzer, 933 F.2d at 1137. “Thus, the relevant statute of limitations
begins to run upon the owner’s demand for return of the art work and the
possessor’s refusal, regardless of the apparent intensity of the owner’s search up
until that point.” Id. at 1138.
205. Id. at 1137; see also Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 76.
206. See Hoelzer, 937 F.2d at 1137. Likewise revealing is the concurring
opinion of Judge Newman, Deweerth’s author:
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that, for purposes of the statute
of limitations, New York law contains no requirement of due diligence
on the part of the original owner in locating property allegedly stolen
from it. However, the Court also ruled that the diligence of the original
owner in seeking to locate its property was a relevant consideration in
applying the doctrine of laches . . . The result of this decision is to
permit a court encountering a dispute between a theft victim and a
goodfaith possessor to consider and balance all the equities, including
the reasonableness of the efforts the theft victim made to locate the
property and the reasonableness of the possessor’s basis for believing
that it was entitled to obtain and keep the property.
Such a broad inquiry will permit a sensitive resolution of difficult
disputes in which there is often much to be said for the positions of each
of the contending sides. Now that New York has authoritatively
advised us that the diligence of the original owner is to be considered
not in determining accrual of the statute of limitations, as we thought
in DeWeerth, but only in assessing the equities under the doctrine of
laches, we must apply that approach to all cases governed by New York
law.
Id. at 1139 (Newman, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
207. Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 76; see also LERNER & BRESLER, supra
note 159, at 27576; Minkovich, supra note 29, at 36869.
208. See Hawkins et al., supra note 7, at 76.
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May 1991, she brought a motion before the Second Circuit,
which the court denied without opinion.209 She continued to
pursue reprieve from the 1987 verdict by filing a new cause
of action in a federal district court under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6).210 The district court
found for DeWeerth, and qualified the New York Court of
Appeal’s decision in Guggenheim as “a new development
justifying Rule 60 relief.”211 In assessing Baldinger’s laches
defense, Judge Broderick emphasized the fact that
restitution would not leave Baldinger without recourse.
After all, the latter could shift the final responsibility for
lack of care in purchasing and reselling the artwork to non
bankrupt third parties “up the chain of possession.”212 Judge
Broderick ordered Baldinger to surrender the Monet,
rejecting her laches defense and arguments of unreasonable
delay and prejudice.213
However, DeWeerth’s victory was fleeting. Soon
Baldinger appealed and the case returned to the Second
Circuit, which again sidestepped the laches issue.214 Based
upon arguments of finality and DeWeerth’s choice of federal
court instead of state forum, the Second Circuit awarded
the painting once again to Baldinger.215 It held that Judge
209. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d,
24 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1994), withdrawn, amended after petition for reh’g, 38 F.3d
1266 (2d Cir. 1994).
210. DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 548. The district court explained:
Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5), a party may be relieved from a final
judgment or order, inter alia, where the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application. Rule 60(b)(6) provides
for relief from a final judgment where there is any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Id. at 541.
212. Id. at 55253 (“Thus plaintiff’s delay does not put the innocent purchaser
in the position of facing loss of the asset without recourse, whereas a ruling for
defendant would leave plaintiff, as the theft victim, with no recourse at all.”).
213. Id. at 553.
214. See Minkovich, supra note 17, at 370.
215. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 187, at 27576; Hawkins et al., supra note
19, at 7677.
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Broderick had improperly used his discretion in deciding
that the “important interest in the finality of the judgment
in this case, which was more than four years old at the time
of that ruling, was outweighed by any injustice DeWeerth
believe[d] she ha[d] suffered by litigating her case in the
federal as opposed to state forum.”216 By her poor choice of
forum, DeWeerth bore the risk that a federal court would
arbitrarily decide an open question of state law.217 When the
U.S. Supreme Court denied DeWeerth’s petition for
certiorari, the Monet saga came to an end and the painting
remained with Baldinger.218
II. THE NEW YORK COURTS’ INCREASED RECEPTIVENESS TO
THE LIMITATION AND LACHES DEFENSES IN CULTURAL
PROPERTY LITIGATION
In the mid1990s, the world witnessed a sudden revival
of Naziera art litigation, which continues to the present
day.219 This modern upsurge can be attributed to a variety of
causes, each of which enhanced the public’s awareness of
the Naziera looting or the availability of information
allowing retrieval.220 In addition, it is not unreasonable to
assume that the modern upsurge in claims would not have
occurred were it not for the resurfacing of the spoliated
works in the art market or in publicly exhibited collections,

216. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1275 (2d Cir. 1994).
217. Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at 77.
218. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 486 U.S. 1056 (1994), denying cert. to 836 F,2d
103 (2d Cir. 1987).
219. See generally KATJA LUBINA, CONTESTED CULTURAL PROPERTY 15966
(2009); MUSEUMS AND THE HOLOCAUST 1321(Norman Palmer ed., 2000); Michael
Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States
Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 16089 (2000); see also Lawrence M. Kaye, Looted
Art: What Can and Should Be Done, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 657, 658 (1998);
Kreder, supra note 27, at 15558; Schwartz, supra note 48, at 1; Cuba, supra
note 21, at 448.
220. LUBINA, supra note 219, at 16066; Benjamin E. Pollock, Out of the Night
and Fog: Permitting Litigation to Prompt an International Resolution to Nazi
Looted Art Claims, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 193, 198 (2006); Michele I. Turner, The
Innocent Buyer of Art Looted During WWII, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1511,
151922 (1999); Collins, supra note 19, at 119; Cuba, supra note 21, at 44849;
Minkovich, supra note 29, at 35355.
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due to the death of the generation of original post war
purchasers.221
Part I described how, at the time of the aforementioned
revival of Holocaustrelated disputes, New York courts
cemented an approach to assessing the timeliness of actions
in replevin and conversion regarding stolen cultural
property. According to the principles the New York Court of
Appeals set out in Guggenheim, this approach dictates that
under New York law, a cause of action to recover a chattel
against a party who has lawfully obtained the property
arises not when the object is initially taken, but when the
demand for its return is refused. This approach does not
mean, however, that an original owner may be lax in
searching for missing property or may delay unreasonably
in making a demand. The owner must be diligent, because
even where the threeyear limitation period has not run, the
claim may be barred by the doctrine of laches, if the current
possessor can show he has suffered prejudice due to the
owner’s unreasonable delay.
Part II will analyze all publicly available case law of the
past fifteen years on the recovery of stolen cultural
property, especially Naziera takings, in the New York
forum. Based on this comprehensive survey of recent case
law, which unlike the few pre1995 Naziera title disputes
has not been discussed as a whole in the literature, Part II
will call attention to the courts’ increasing receptiveness to
the limitation and laches defenses in stolen art litigation in
general, and Holocaustrelated title disputes in particular.
The analysis will lead to the conclusion that henceforth it
will be unlikely for Holocaust survivors (or their heirs) to
prevail in their attempts to obtain recovery of their stolen
heirlooms. In spite of former policies favoring the position of
original owners, New York law appears to have shifted in
the other direction.

221. Hector Feliciano et al., Nazi Stolen Art, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 67, 73
(1998); Owen C. Pell, The Potential for a Mediation/Arbitration Commission to
Resolve Disputes Relating to Artworks Stolen or Looted During World War II, 10
DEPAULLCA J. ART & ENT. L. 27, 46. (1999); Howard N. Spiegler, Recovering
NaziLooted Art: Report from the Front Lines, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 297, 299
(2001); Collins, supra note 19, at 120; Minkovich, supra note 29, at 354.
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A. The New York Courts’ Increased Receptiveness to the
Limitation Defense
Over the past fifteen years, New York courts have
continued to apply the wellestablished “demand and
refusal” rule to determine the moment of accrual of the
original owner’s cause of action in replevin.222 Recent case
law, however, has introduced two mechanisms that have
increasingly favored the actual possessor, contrary to the
Menzel court’s preference of safeguarding the rights of the
original owner. One mechanism employed by the New York
courts involved a rather discretionary advance of the
moment of accrual in certain cases by inferring an implicit
demand and refusal from the parties’ actions or inactions.
In addition, in some recent cases, the courts have accepted
the parties’ conscious exploitation of inherent anomalies in
the demand and refusal rule to accelerate accrual.
1. Implicit Demand and Refusal. In Grosz v. Museum of
Modern Art,223 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York inferred an implicit refusal
from the position the museum had taken during ongoing
negotiations with the Grosz heirs. The case concerned a
lawsuit, brought by Martin and Lilian Grosz, the son and
daughterinlaw of the late German artist George Grosz,
against the Museum of Modern Art (“MoMA”), seeking the
return of three of his major caricatural works that were
being held in the MoMA collection: Republican Automatons,
Portrait of the Poet Max HerrmanNeisse, and SelfPortrait
with Model.224 Although Grosz was not Jewish, his work
typified the kind of “Entartete Kunst” (degenerate art)
222. A great deal of these title disputes concerned converted artwork or
collectibles. See Doss, Inc. v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 10577 (LAP), 2009 WL
3053713 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2009); Interested Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Ross, No.
04 Civ. 43281 (RWS), 2005 WL 2840330, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2005);
Christie’s Inc., v. Davis, 247 F. Supp. 2d 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); McGough v.
Leslie, 884 N.Y.S.2d 756 (App. Div. 2009); Douglas v. Christie’s Int’l, PLC, 640
N.Y.S.2d 530 (App. Div. 1996); Sports Legends, Inc. v. Carberry, 2008 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 7881, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2008); In re Lumerman, 856 N.Y.S.2d 469
(Sur. Ct. 2008).
223. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667, 09 Civ. 3706 (CM) (THK), at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 6, 2010 2010), aff’d, No. 10257, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25659, at *1 (2d Cir.
Dec. 16, 2010).
224. Id. at *1.
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Hitler hated.225 “As a result Grosz fled Germany in 1933.226
After his departure, he was branded an “enemy of the state”
by the Third Reich, and in 1938, the Nazigovernment
rendered him stateless, revoking his citizenship and
confiscating what remained of his assets.227 In the years
following his emigration, the three caricatures were on
consignment with Alfred Flechtheim, Grosz’s exclusive
dealer.228 After Flechtheim’s death in 1937, Grosz’s work
allegedly “fell prey to a network of unscrupulous art
professionals, who took advantage of the political climate at
that time to divest Grosz of his ownership.”229 Each of the
works entered the MoMA collection in due course, either by
sale or donation, between the late 1940s or early 1950s.230
On November 24, 2003, the Grosz heirs first demanded
return of the works on the contention that they were
wrongfully taken during the Nazi reign.231 Over the next
years the heirs and the MoMA exchanged a series of letters
and had several meetings to discuss the ownership of the
artwork.232 At no point during these negotiations did MoMA
acknowledge the Grosz heirs’ ownership of the works or
relinquish custody of them, despite their demand.233
However,
throughout
these
years,
the
museum
administration communicated that it had engaged
researchers to study the provenance of the paintings, had
planned meetings with its Board of Trustees, and had
retained former Attorney General Katzenbach to review the
research as an independent expert.234 On April 12, 2006, the
museum at last sent a final letter firmly expressing its
continued refusal to turn over the paintings.235 On April 10,
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *2.
229. Id. at *56.
230. See id. at *616 (describing in detail how the paintings ended up in the
museum).
231. Id. at *16.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *27.
235. Id.
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2009, when they thought they were still within the relevant
threeyear limitation period, the Grosz heirs commenced an
action in replevin.236 The museum moved to dismiss the
complaint as timebarred, arguing that refusal had
unmistakably occurred earlier during the negotiation
process, given the museum’s previous letters and continued
retention of the paintings.237
In order to determine the exact moment of accrual, the
district court analyzed the purport of the museums’
communication towards the Grosz family.238 The court’s
analysis was not limited to the museum’s written
communication, but also encompassed acts that could be
deemed as an implicit refusal.239 In its decision, the court
relied on scant available case law that addressed the
requirements of a “refusal” for purposes of the “demand and
refusal” rule.240
The Grosz court first quoted the New York Appellate
Division’s decision in Feld v. Feld.241 In Feld, the parties
were the sons of the late Maude and Samuel Feld.242 The
plaintiff Stuart Feld had “resided with his parents as an
adult from 1961 to 1967, and claim[ed] that he left various
items of his personal property with them when he moved
out, including antiques and objects of art.”243 He wrote to his
parents in 1971 and 1974 to assert ownership over these
items
and
“directed
their
return
through
an
intermediary.”244 However, his father conditioned any return
of the artwork upon resolution of unrelated claims made by
the parents against their son and his antiques firm.245 No
further action occurred until the parents’ death in 1995.246
236. Id., at *16.
237. Id. at *16, *2225.
238. Id. at *2838.
239. Id.
240. Id. at *24.
241. Id. (quoting Feld v. Feld, 720 N.Y.S.2d 35 (App. Div. 2001)).
242. Feld, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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Soon thereafter, Stuart Feld brought an action in replevin
against his brother, individually and as estate executor,
seeking the return of the art objects he had left behind in
1967 which were listed as part of the parent’s estate.247 The
New York Supreme Court dismissed the brother’s motion
for summary judgment, which argued that the claim was
timebarred.248 The court found there had been no clear
refusal by the parents to return the property, so that the
cause of action had not accrued.249 The appellate division,
however, found the action in replevin was timebarred,
reasoning that for limitation purposes:
A demand need not use the specific word “demand” so long as it
clearly conveys the exclusive claim of ownership. A demand
consists of an assertion that one is the owner of the property and
that the one upon whom the demand is made has no rights in it
other than allowed by the demander. By the same reasoning, a
refusal need not use the specific word “refuse” so long as it clearly
conveys an intent to interfere with the demander’s possession or
250
use of his property.

According to the court, the father’s 1974 letter clearly
constituted a refusal: he had conditioned return of the
artwork on resolution of other disputes, and demonstrated
conduct that was inconsistent with Stuart Feld’s asserted
ownership.251
The second case relied on by the Grosz court similarly
concerned converted artwork. Spanierman Gallery Profit
Sharing Plan v. Merritt252 involved an interpleader action to
determine the appropriate disposition of the painting Grand
Canyon by Arthur Wesley Dow.253 Spanierman argued, inter
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 3637.
250. Id. at 37 (citations omitted).
251. Id.
252. No. 00 Civ. 5712 (THK), 2004 WL 1781006, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
2004).
253. Id. Spanierman Gallery asserted that Merritt sold the work to Fagan. Id.
Fagan subsequently put the painting up for auction in Massachusetts, where
Spanierman acquired it for $165,000. Merritt v. Fagan, No. CV9903378665,
2002 WL 1331839, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 17, 2002), aff’d, 828 A.2d 685
(Conn. App. Ct. 2003). Merritt, on the other hand, contended that she
transferred the painting to Fagan for appraisal purposes only and that Fagan
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alia, that Merritt’s title claim was timebarred.254 The
district court, interpreting New York law, reiterated New
York’s “demand and refusal” rule, as set out in
Guggenheim.255 As the parties disputed the precise time of
refusal, and thus accrual, the court explained that demand
and refusal could be implicit, thereby repeating verbatim
the words of the appellate division in Feld.256
Finally, the Grosz court addressed Borumand v. Assar,
a 2005 case in which the United States District Court for
the Western District of New York took the Feld doctrine one
step further, holding that refusal need not to be conveyed in
words at all.257 In Borumand, the defendant never explicitly
informed the plaintiff that he would not relinquish
possession.258 Although he had maintained that he would do
so, he never actually turned over the property.259 The court
ultimately held that the cause of action accrued one year
after the initial demand, since by that time, the plaintiff
should have reasonably concluded that the defendant’s
actions in putting her off amounted to a refusal.260
Bearing in mind the decisions in Feld, Spanierman, and
Borumand, the Grosz court analyzed the correspondence
between the parties.261 It granted the museum’s motion to
dismiss, holding that the threeyear limitation period had
had breached the contract and converted the painting. Id. In November 1999,
Merritt commenced a lawsuit against Fagan in a Connecticut state court,
seeking damages for breach of contract and conversion. Spanierman Gallery,
2004 WL 1781006, at *2. She was awarded over $395,000 in damages. See
Merritt, 2002 WL 1331839, at *7. After filing the lawsuit against Fagan,
Merritt’s attorney made a report to the FBI, which seized the painting after an
investigation. Spanierman Gallery, 2004 WL 1781006, at *2. The U.S.
Attorney’s Office then commenced an interpleader action. Id.
254. Spanierman Gallery, 2004 WL 1781006, at *1.
255. Id. at *4.
256. See id. at *5 (quoting Feld v. Feld, 720 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (App. Div. 2001)).
257. Borumand v. Assar, No. 01CV6258P, 2005 WL 741786, at *14 (W.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2005) (“Actions may be sufficient to constitute a refusal if they amount
to an overt and positive act of conversion.”).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at *16.
261. Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667, 09 Civ.
3706 (CM) (THK), at *2838 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2010 2010).
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commenced no later than July 20, 2005.262 At that time the
museum had communicated in a letter that it challenged
the plaintiff’s alleged rights to possession of the works.263
Although the same letter also contained language that could
temper an original owner’s decision to bring suit, the court
found that, “coupled with the museum’s continued retention
of the artwork, the letter indicated the museum’s continuing
intent to interfere with the rights the family had asserted in
its demand.”264 “This is all the refusal the law could possibly
require before plaintiff’s causes of action for conversion or
replevin (as well as the corresponding equitable claims)
accrued.”265 After all, “the museum’s actions and statements
were inconsistent with the demander’s claim to
ownership.”266
Generally, the technique of inferring a demand and/or
refusal from the parties’ actions or inactions is not
unreasonable. Actions, as we all know, can sometimes speak
louder than words. Although in most cases implicit refusal
causes the limitation period to commence earlier and can
thus affect the timeliness of the original owner’s action, the
technique is not specifically aimed at denying a plaintiff’s
chances for recovery. There are still circumstances in which
it could benefit an owner by allowing him to bring a claim
without first making explicit demand upon the possessor.
Nonetheless, the technique of implicit “demand and
refusal” bestows considerable discretion upon the court, as
in some cases it can rather easily upset the owner’s chances
of arguing that he indeed brought a timely action. Again,
this is not contrary to the rationales underlying statutory
limitation; it simply gives more scope to the courts to secure
the effectiveness of the judiciary, penalize obvious
dilatoriness, and hold back surprise litigation over matters
from days long gone. In this sense, the decision in Feld
merits approval, given that the letter in which the father
communicated his conditions for return necessarily
262. Id. at *31.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 31.
266. Id. at *35. Soon thereafter, the district court dismissed as futile the Grosz
heirs’ motions for reconsideration and leave to amend. Grosz v. Museum of
Modern Art, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20248, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010).
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amounted to a refusal, and is further fortified by nearly
twenty years of complete silence that followed the letter.
However, it is questionable whether application of the same
discretion is equally satisfactory in cases where the parties
are obviously in the process of negotiation. In Grosz, the
court advanced accrual to an earlier time in the course of
the parties’ negotiations in order to frustrate an action the
plaintiff clearly considered timely in view of a later letter
from the museum that expressed formal refusal. While
these circumstances cannot be determinative of whether the
Grosz heirs should have been entitled to the paintings, in
situations where the time of accrual is ambiguous and
debatable, a decision on the merits of the case rather than
on technicalities would be more satisfactory, especially in
sensitive cases involving claims for Holocaustrelated losses.
2. Consciously Exploited Anomaly. Unlike the implicit
“demand and refusal” rule, which is justified under
appropriate circumstances, a second mechanism, which
successfully exploits the anomaly inherent in the “demand
and refusal” rule, appears most objectionable.
Recall that the Menzel court’s introduction of the
“demand and refusal” rule for limitation purposes was
greeted with criticism. The rule created an inherent
anomaly by subverting the rationale behind the demand
requirement of safeguarding innocent purchasers against
sudden liability for unknowingly possessing converted
goods.267 Worse still, as has been exposed by some
commentators, this anomaly is even more egregious because
using the “demand and refusal” rule as a mechanism to
determine accrual actually rewards bad faith.268 In practice,
a bona fide purchaser will almost never acquire title
through the running of the limitations period, while a
conscious convertor, such as a thief or bad faith purchaser,
may find repose after only three years.269
The Grosz court was wellaware of the mechanism’s
inherent anomaly.270 Consequently, for purposes of deciding
267. See supra Part I.B.2.
268. Gerstenblith, supra note 65, at 13839; Hawkins et al., supra note 19, at
66; Thomas, supra note 56, at 258; Eisen, supra note 18, at 108081; Petrovich,
supra note 21, at 1139.
269. See supra notes 10405 and accompanying text.
270. Grosz, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667, at *18. The district court reiterated:

672

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

the motion and in order to apply the “demand and refusal”
rule, the court assumed that the heirs were not alleging
that the museum had acquired any of the works in bad
faith.271 Leaving aside whether any equitable problems were
posed, the court observed that if MoMA actually took title to
the artwork in bad faith, then absent any tolling of the
limitation period due to fraudulent concealment, the heirs’
claims had been barred some time in the 1950s, three years
after the museum would have knowingly acquired wrongful
ownership.272
The court’s observation regarding potential equitable
tolling was not without reason. In that connection it is often
argued that the anomaly inherent in the “demand and
refusal” rule is actually only on the surface; as the doctrine
of fraudulent concealment, leading to equitable estoppel, in
principle can prevent bad faith purchasers and thieves from
benefitting from the limitation defense. Indeed, in General
Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, the New York Court of Appeals
explained that the “demand and refusal” rule does not favor
the thief or the bad faith purchaser over the bona fide
purchaser.273 The court held that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel prevents a wrongdoer from asserting the
limitations defense so as to take “refuge behind the shield of
his own wrong.”274 Most likely, a wrongdoer’s possession will
not satisfy the “open and notorious” requirement. However,
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is a strict one, as it
Under New York law, the statute of limitations for conversion and
replevin automatically begins to run against a bad faith possessor on
the date of the theft or bad faith acquisition—even if the true owner is
unaware the chattel is missing. By contrast, “An innocent purchaser of
stolen goods becomes a wrongdoer only after refusing the owner’s
demand for their return.” Therefore, a cause of action accrues against a
bona fide purchaser when the purchaser refuses to return the property
in question.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678
F.2d 1150, 1161 (2d Cir. 1982)).
271. Id. at *2223. However, the court observed that its assumption did
contradict certain allegations in the heirs’ complaint, notably that at the time of
acquisition the museum clearly knew that it was trying to purchase a stolen
Grosz. Id. at *23 n.3.
272. Id. at *23 n.4.
273. 219 N.E.2d 169, 171 (N.Y. 1966).
274. Id. at 170; see also Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar, 678 F.2d at 116364.

2011]

HAS THE TIME (OF LACHES) COME?

673

traditionally arises only against a wrongdoer who commits
egregious, affirmative acts of concealment. Under Chiappa’s
rationale, the requirements for estoppel would not be
satisfied if, for example, a bad faith purchaser openly
displays stolen paintings in his home.275 Consequently, in
some cases of theft or bad faith acquisition, the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment is actually powerless, allowing a
bad faith defendant, undeserving of the protection of the
demand requirement, to get off scotfree, insulated from suit
by the statute of limitations’ bar. It is this inequity that the
Grosz court seemed concerned about when it commented
that if MoMA had actually acquired the artwork in bad
faith, then the heirs’ claims would have been barred three
years after the conscious acquisition, precisely because it
saw no reason to toll the statute of limitations on the basis
of fraudulent concealment.276
In that connection, the district court referred to the
decision in CloseBarzin v. Christie’s, Inc.277 In this case, the
appellate division found that the plaintiff’s action for
conversion brought against Christie’s was timebarred for
two reasons. First, the court held that the action was
commenced more than three years after the alleged taking
of the property had occurred.278 In view of the plaintiff’s
contention that the defendants knowingly consigned and
sold the plaintiff’s property, the court held that “demand
and refusal” were not prerequisites of an action for
conversion.279 Second, the court ruled that Christie’s was
also not barred by the doctrine of fraudulent concealment
from asserting the statute of limitations defense.280
Although the plaintiff had alleged bad faith, the court held
that she was not affirmatively “induced by the defendants
to refrain from pursuing her claims”281 and that she “had
275. But see Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar, 678 F.2d at 1163, n.23
(disagreeing with such a narrow reading of Chiappa). According to the Second
Circuit, “Chiappa stands for the general proposition, resting on estoppel
principles, that a defendant who commits affirmative wrongdoing should not be
afforded the benefits of the statute of limitations defense.” Id.
276. Grosz, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667, at *23, n.4.
277. 857 N.Y.S.2d 545 (App. Div. 2008).
278. Id. at 546.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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sufficient information to commence an action for conversion
well within the limitations period.”282
The decision in CloseBarzin painfully illustrates how in
practice bad faith converters may be better protected.
Although the outcome is openly contrary to the outcomes
the Menzel court aimed to achieve by adopting a “demand
and refusal” rule, CloseBarzin is unfortunately not an
isolated case. Strangely enough, in the recent title dispute
Kapernekas v. Brandhorst, regarding two works of art by
contemporary artist Damien Hirst, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York seemed
comfortable observing that the plaintiff’s claim was time
barred depending upon “whether [the] defendant [had]
openly dealt with the works in a manner that would
preclude [the] plaintiff from invoking the demand and
refusal rule.”283 If the defendant had dealt with the works in
good faith, the plaintiff’s cause of action would not have
accrued until demand was made; however, if the defendant
had openly acted in bad faith, then it was a lost cause, as
the plaintiff would not have the benefit of the “demand and
refusal” rule to prevent his claim from being timebarred.
A similarly troubling illustration of the anomaly can be
found in Johnson v. Smithsonian Institution, another
dispute regarding converted artwork.284 The district court
281. Id. (emphasis added).
282. Id.
283. Kapernekas v. Brandhorst, 638 F. Supp. 2d 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
284. Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 9 F. Supp. 2d. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d in
part and rev’ in part by 189 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 1999). In this case, James
Johnson, the representative of distributees of the estate of his artist uncle
William Johnson, brought an action in replevin and conversion against the
Smithsonian Institution and the Rosenfeld Gallery. Smithsonian, 9 F. Supp. 2d
at 349. From 1926 until 1947 Johnson had created over 1,000 artworks, many of
which were exhibited at prestigious venues throughout the world. Id. His agent
was the Harmon Foundation, a nonprofit organization that assisted African
American artists. Id. In 1946, Johnson moved to Europe and, prior to the move,
requested the return of all of his artwork, yet the foundation fraudulently held
on to several of his creations. Id. at 350. Soon thereafter, Johnson was
diagnosed with syphilisinduced paresis and pronounced mentally incompetent.
Id. at 349. He died in 1970 in a New York State psychiatric institution. Id. The
New York Supreme Court appointed a committee to administer his assets. Id.
The committee stored the artwork in their possession in a warehouse facility
between 1948 and 1956. Id. In 1955, it attempted to sell his work, but to no
avail. Id. The committee then sought leave to abandon the artwork, which the
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dismissed the claims by contrasting the “demand and
refusal” rule with the rule of instant accrual for intentional
conversions, as it reasoned:
Johnson allegedly requested that his art be returned to him in
1946. Allegedly, the Harmon Foundation tortiously held onto the
art in 1946. The three year statute of limitations for conversion or
replevin thus began running at that time, even though Johnson
was allegedly unaware that the Foundation—which was the
original tortfeasor, as opposed to a goodfaith purchaser—did not
285
return the art in spite of Johnson’s demand.

Moreover, the court added that Johnson’s lack of legal
capacity did not operate to equitably toll the statute of
limitations under New York law, “because the disability did
not exist at the time the cause of action accrued.”286 The
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims against
the Smithsonian, but reversed and remanded the dismissal
of claims against the Rosenfeld Gallery.287 It explained that
the gallery would have prevailed if Johnson had alleged bad
faith instead of good faith:
“Although seemingly anomalous,” the Rosenfeld Gallery was not
protected by the same statute of limitations because the gallery
was not alleged to have been a “thief.” The statute of limitations
does not begin to run on any claims against a goodfaith purchaser
of stolen artwork, which the gallery is alleged to have been, until
“the true owner makes demand for return of the chattel and the
person in possession of the chattel refuses to return it.” No
demand was made upon the Rosenfeld Gallery until 1995 and the
court granted on April 30, 1956. Id. at 350. Soon thereafter the committee
transferred Johnson’s artwork to the Harmon Foundation which had expressed
an interest in restoring the paintings for their historical significance. Id.
Consequently, the foundation held in its possession both the 1947 artwork it
had fraudulently withheld, along with artwork transferred from the committee
in 1956. In 1967, the Harmon Foundation donated some 1,154 pieces to the
Smithsonian, where most of it remained. Id. At some point in the 1980s or
1990s, Rosenfeld Gallery acquired approximately thirty pieces of Johnson’s
artwork. Id. Johnson’s work is now recognized as having substantial value—
artistically, economically, and historically. In 1995, James Johnson demanded
that Rosenfeld and the Smithsonian return to Johnson’s heirs all of his artwork
in their possession, and was refused. Id. He filed a complaint on July 16, 1997.
Id. at 349.
285. Id. at 354.
286. Id.
287. Smithsonian, 189 F.3d at 190.
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complaint in this lawsuit was served less than three years later,
288
in 1997, within the time prescribed by the statute.

The preceding cases are troubling despite Guggenheim’s
characterization of “seemingly anomalous.” They illustrate
how in specific circumstances, the “demand and refusal”
rule may lead to actual unfairness. In that respect,
defendants, especially those who held the disputed artwork
openly as most museums do, may soon be tempted to
systematically argue that they are bad faith converters in
order to accelerate accrual by exploiting the anomaly
inherent in New York’s accrual doctrine.289 The demanding
requirements of fraudulent concealment, leading to
equitable estoppel, render this mechanism disturbingly
common in Naziera title disputes.
B. The New York Courts’ Increased Receptiveness to the
Laches Defense
When the upsurge in Naziera art litigation
overwhelmed the New York art world in the late 1990s,
Guggenheim had only recently established the application of
laches as a remedial development in the law of replevin.
With misappropriations that had occurred more than five
decades ago, Holocaustrelated title disputes were well
placed to further develop New York’s unique approach. On
numerous occasions, the New York state and federal courts
relied on Guggenheim to apply laches to balance the
interests of victimized owners and good faith purchasers.290
288. Id. at 188 n.6 (quoting Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569
N.E. 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991)).
289. See, e.g., Martin v. Briggs, 663 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (App. Div. 1997)
(illustrating that the defendants argued open, yet bad faith conversion of
paintings that were held on bailment, in order to benefit from a shorter
limitation period).
290. Of note, the doctrine of laches issue did not arise solely in the New York
courts in the context of applying New York substantive law to determine
ownership. Pursuant to Section 202 of the CPLR, the laches issue also surfaced
as procedural law of forum, even when the courts applied foreign substantive
law. See, e.g., Warin v. Wildenstein & Co., 746 N.Y.S.2d 282, 28283 (App. Div.
2002). In this case, the greatnephew of Alphonse Kann, a FrenchJewish
collector who fled to London in anticipation of a German invasion, brought an
action for the recovery of eight illuminated manuscripts from the Wildenstein
Foundation. Warin v. Wildenstein & Co., No. 115143/99, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
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In assessing whether laches barred the plaintiff’s action
in replevin, the courts stood by the doctrine’s standard
twofold requirement of unreasonable delay and prejudice.291
However, for a considerable period, the double requirement
for a successful laches defense was practically
insurmountable for defendants in stolen art cases. Consider
that neither Guggenheim, nor its immediate successors such
as Turkey v. Metropolitan, Golden Budha, Hoelzer or the
DeWeerth sequel, actually found for the defendant on a
laches basis. Even if the possessor could somehow make a
case for unreasonable delay, he came up short on the
prejudice requirement.292 Yet in view of recent decisions, the
laches defense has undeniably gained strength in stolen art
cases, especially Holocaustrelated disputes, as the courts
have shown increasing willingness in finding that the
passage of time was unreasonable and resulted in prejudice.
1. Unreasonable Delay. Given the doctrine’s equitable
nature, laches operates on a factspecific basis.293 After all,
whether the delay in bringing the action in replevin was
unreasonable depends entirely on the circumstances of the
case. In practice, the question of unreasonable delay is
tantamount to whether the original owner was reasonably
diligent in tracing his stolen property,294 which is a
quintessential determination of fact. Therefore, one would
expect laches to be resolved at a factfinding trial
proceeding. Indeed, the significance of assessing material
issues of fact often precluded the court from granting
542, at *12, *5 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 4, 2001); see also Bakalar v. Vavra, 550 F. Supp.
2d 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v.
Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7664 (KMW), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1327, at *2324
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1999); Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage Warehouse,
Inc., No. 105575/00, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 693, at *1419 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 28,
2001).
291. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., No. 04 Civ. 1253 (JSR), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 636, at *67 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2005) (“Under the doctrine of
laches, a suit will be dismissed when a plaintiff has engaged in unreasonable
delay in bringing suit and defendant has suffered prejudice as a result of the
delay.”); In re Flamenbaum, 899 N.Y.S.2d 546, 552 (Sur. Ct. 2010) (“The
doctrine of laches is an equitable defense based on an unreasonable delay by a
victim in bringing a claim, which in turn causes prejudice to the possessor.”).
292. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
293. In re Flamenbaum, 899 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
294. See Sanchez, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 636, at *7.
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summary judgment motions brought on laches grounds.295
On the other hand, in the past decade, New York courts
have resolved a number of cases on summary judgment,
deeming the carelessness displayed by the original owner in
tracing his property so apparent that laches could be found
as a matter of law.296 Although it is important not to
overestimate the purport of the latter factdriven decisions,
they have weight and provide some insight into the
standards the courts may take into consideration in
deciding future cases.
In Guggenheim, the museum prevailed without having
made any effort to obtain recovery for over twenty years.
However, it is very likely that future cases in which there is
almost complete inaction on the part of the theft victim over
a considerable period of time are bound to end in failure.
295. See, e.g., Malanga v. Chamberlain, No. 38886/05, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
4711 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2008); aff’d., 896 N.Y.S.2d 385 (App. Div. 2010). The
dispute revolved around a work of art, known as 315 Johns, which consists of
315 eight inch square silkscreens depicting John Chamberlain’s face, a world
renowned sculptor. Malanga, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS at *12. In the 1960s,
Gerard Malanga was Andy Warhol’s righthand man. Id. at *2. Malanga alleged
that in 1971, he, along with fellow artists, created the small silkscreens that
were later incorporated into 315 Johns. Id. They were all done in Warhol’s style,
but without his knowledge. Id. Sometime in 1977, the portraits were moved to
Chamberlain’s loft where the latter allegedly agreed to store them without
charge. Id. Until Malanga reconnected with Chamberlain in 2004, he had not
given any further thought to the portraits. Id. However, on that occasion,
Chamberlain advised Malanga that in 2000 he had sold the portraits for
$5,000,000 by depicting the artwork as a genuine Warhol. Id. Thereupon
Malanga commenced an action for conversion and replevin. Id. The appellate
division affirmed the supreme court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, because “triable issues of fact existed as to whether the
plaintiff’s delay in making a demand and commencing the action was
unreasonable and inexcusable, and whether the delay resulted in prejudice to
the defendant.” Malanga, 896 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
296. E.g. In re AshPeters, 821 N.Y.S.2d 61, 69 (App. Div. 2006). In In re
Peters, the appellate division held:
Where the due diligence of the original owner of a work of art raises
questions of fact, the issue of whether its lack of diligence operated to
the prejudice of the party currently in possession of the artwork is
appropriately resolved at trial. However, where the original owner’s
lack of due diligence and prejudice to the party currently in possession
are apparent, the issue may be resolved as a matter of law.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Indeed, the courts are increasingly willing to find the
owner’s efforts unsatisfactory.
For instance, in Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage
Warehouse, Inc.,297 a Holocaustrelated title dispute
regarding a Pissarro painting,298 the New York Supreme
Court dismissed the action on the grounds of laches. With
respect to the unreasonableness of the delay, the court
emphasized that since the early 1950s, the Wertheimers
had literally done nothing to recover the painting. The court
especially took issue with the fact that the original owner
failed to report the painting missing to the Art Loss
Register or contact galleries or museums about the loss.299
Other Holocaustrelated lawsuits support the same
conclusion, either questioning the fact that the original
owner or his immediate heirs did not seek compensation or
297. No. 105575/00, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 693 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 2001),
aff’d., 752 N.Y.S.2d 295 (App. Div. 2002).
298. When Pierre Wertheimer, the plaintiff’s grandfather, fled France in June
1940, he left his art collection behind with Parisian friends. Id. at *2. In October
1940, his son Jacques, who had just been decommissioned from the French
army, was waiting for an exit visa to join his family in the United States when
he met Mr. Ehrlich, who claimed to be his father’s longtime friend. Id. at *23.
Jacques advised Ehrlich that he wished to take his father’s art collection with
him. Id. at *3. Thereupon Ehrlich convinced the Wertheimers that he could help
them organize a shipment, yet as soon as Ehrlich laid hands on the artwork, he
disappeared. Id. By 1945, when Pierre was able to return to France, Ehrlich had
dispersed most of the artwork, including the Pissarro. Id. Pierre filed a
complaint against Ehrlich in 1947. Id. at *4. As a result of the proceedings
against Ehrlich, Pierre was able to recover most of the stolen artworks, but not
the Pissarro. Id. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the Wertheimers took several
further steps to recover the painting. Id. at *5. A 1947 publication made
reference to the missing work and listed the property as removed from France
during World War II. Id. In addition, Pierre caused influential people to contact
a number of governmental entities in Europe charged with recovering lost art.
Id. To date, it is unclear what actually happened to the painting after Ehrlich
disposed of it. Id. at *6. Nevertheless, the Pissarro resurfaced in New York in
1951. Id. In 1999, through a long chain of subsequent transactions, the painting
finally ended up in the possession of an Arizona art dealer, who shipped it to
New York in anticipation of a sale. Id. at 7. At the Cirker’s Hayes Storage
Warehouse, however, the artwork was seen by a dealer who was aware of its
connection to the Wertheimer family. Id. at *89. In March 2000, the dealer
notified the family of the painting’s whereabouts and Wertheimer filed an action
in replevin. Id.
299. Id. at *1819. The appellate division affirmed the judgment. Wertheimer,
752 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
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recovery after World War II, or emphasizing their omission
to contact the authorities and list the loss with the
appropriate registries. In In re AshPeters,300 the estate of
Maria Ash, the wife of Holocaust victim Curt Glaser, sought
to recover Strasse in Kragero by Edvard Munch from an
individual who purchased the work in good faith at a
Sotheby’s auction.301 However, the court stated that the
action was barred by the statute of limitations and the
doctrine of laches. With respect to laches, the court
emphasized that after World War II, “Maria [Ash] made no
mention of the painting in her claim seeking restitution
from the German government,” and thus was responsible
for the purchaser’s difficult position by allowing a painting
with particularly troublesome provenance to circulate
freely.302
In In re Flamenbaum,303 the recent Naziera lawsuit
regarding an Assyrian amulet, the Surrogate’s Court of New
York again found for the defendant on laches grounds.304 In
this case the original owner had also taken no steps to trace
300. In re AshPeters, 821 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
301. Id. at 6364. Professor Glaser, the director of the State Museum in Berlin,
was Jewish and therefore forced to resign from his position and flee Germany in
1933. Id. at 63. The professor’s art collection was auctioned off to finance his
flight. Id. However, the Munch painting, which the artist himself once gave to
Glaser, was left in the care of Glaser’s brother, an art dealer, “who apparently
sold the work within the following year without first obtaining consent.” Id. The
painting eventually entered the large collection of Albert Otten, a Jewish steel
magnate. Id. at 64. “In 1937, [Otten], too, was forced to flee Germany but, unlike
Glaser, [he] was able to send many of his paintings out of the country.” Id.
Professor Glaser died in 1943. Id. At that time “his interest in the painting, if
any, passed to his wife, [Maria Ash], and upon her death, to her estate.” Id. In
the case at bar, the controversy arose when the Otten family sold the painting
through Sotheby’s in June 2002. Id. The executrix of the estate sought an order
directing the auctioneer “to disclose the identity of the purchaser and the
whereabouts of the painting.” Id. Unlike the trial court, the Appellate Division
concluded that the petitioner had “failed to establish a meritorious cause of
action so as to warrant disclosure.” Id. at 63. Of interest were the court’s
considerations concerning the statute of limitations and laches issue, as it held
that “[u]nder any alternative view of the facts, the estate’s potential action
against the goodfaith purchaser was barred . . . .” Id.
302. Id. at 6869.
303. 899 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sur. Ct. 2010). For more factual background, see supra
note 1 and accompanying text.
304. Id. at 554.
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the artifact for about sixty years.305 The court put much
weight on the fact that the loss was never reported to any
legal authority in any country, nor was the work listed as
missing with any international art registry.306 The court
especially felt strongly about the original owner’s continued
passivity, even after learning that the amulet had allegedly
been seen in the market.307
It is interesting to contrast these cases with the decision
in United States v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., a title
dispute regarding a stolen painting by George Benjamin
Luks.308 The court refused to find the original owner’s claim
barred by laches, as in the wake of the theft he had
promptly reported the loss to the police, his insurance
company, and the gallery where he had purchased the
painting.309 The court called his conduct “both appropriate
and reasonable by any standard,” certainly in view of the
fact he was a mere private owner.310
Sotheby’s Inc. v. Shene311 seems to establish the only
clear exception to the current policy of requiring reporting,
registration, and continuous and significant efforts over
time to locate the missing work. The case revolved around a
title dispute between a dealer in ancient books and the
German State of BadenWurttemberg regarding a
sixteenthcentury German volume of drawings and
etchings, known as the Augsburger Geschlechterbuch.312 The
305. Id.
306. Id. at 55354.
307. Id.
308. U.S. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 99 Civ. 2622 (BSJ), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 804, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2001).
309. Id. at *2.
310. Id. at *11.
311. No. 04 Civ. 10067 (TPG), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37524 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23,
2005).
312. Id, at *35. “From at least 1858 to 1945, the book was stored in . . . the
Staatsgalerie Stuttgart, and was therefore stamped on each page with that
institution’s insignia.” Id. at *3. “After World War II, the Staatsgalerie
discovered that the book was missing from [the] storage facility in Waldenburg,
where the museum had stored certain artifacts to protect them during the war.”
Id. The book appeared to have been destroyed during fires that broke out when
allied soldiers seized the storage facility. Id. “During the events leading to [the
interpleader action], however, the parties learned that the book had instead
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district court held that, although the original owners did not
look for the book, there was no basis for finding laches as it
was only in 2004 that BadenWurttemberg learned that the
Geschlechterbuch still existed.313 Until then, it reasonably
believed that the book, like so many other artifacts, had
been destroyed in the war.314 Moreover, BadenWurttemberg
could demonstrate that it “diligently pursued claims for
other objects that it believed had been stolen, rather than
destroyed.”315 “Once the Staatsgalerie and Baden
Wurttemberg finally learned of the book’s existence in 2004,
as a result of contacts from Sotheby’s, they moved swiftly
and diligently” to reclaim it.316
In Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v.
Christie’s, Inc.,317 on the other hand, the original owner was
found at fault for decades of inactivity, during which the
patriarchate forbore from reporting the theft to the
authorities, spreading the news in the art world, or listing
the work missing with the appropriate registries.318 The
dispute concerned a palimpsest, a tenthcentury manuscript
containing a copy of certain writings of Archimedes.319 The
palimpsest was once part of the library of the Greek
Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, but had disappeared
from the collection at least 70 years before.320 The
likely been stolen by John Doty, a U.S. Army Captain who was stationed in
Waldenburg.” Id. In June 2001, Rob Shene, a dealer in ancient books, purchased
the Geschlechterbuch for about $3,800 from Margulis, a book dealer who had
bought it from the Doty family. Id. at *34. In March 2004, Shene consigned the
book to Sotheby’s. Id. at 4. However, prior to the auction, Sotheby’s contacted
the Staatsgalerie “to obtain information about the book’s provenance.” Id.
Shortly thereafter, the German consulate notified Sotheby’s that Baden
Wurttemberg, which had acquired legal ownership of the Staatsgalerie’s
collections some time after WWII, was entitled to the book and demanded its
return. Id. Thereupon, Sotheby’s brought the interpleader action. Id. at 5.
313. Id. at *12.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. No. 98 Civ. 7664 (KMW), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18,
1999).
318. Id. at *33.
319. Id. at *1.
320. Id. at *2. In the nineteenth century the palimpsest was incorporated into
the library of the Patriarchate in Jerusalem and subsequently transferred to a
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Patriarchate rediscovered the book at Christie’s New York
in 1998 and demanded its return, but to no avail.321
Although the district court ultimately ruled that the
defendant had acquired title to the manuscript under
French law,322 it still addressed the laches defense. The
court found that, based upon the record, the Patriarchate
had not been diligent at all.323 The case was especially
interesting because the district court rebutted the
Patriarchate’s argument that as an order of monks, it could
not be expected to spend its days searching for a painting.324
However, with DeWeerth in mind, the court severely
observed that “if the Patriarchate was able to retain counsel
with impressive speed to bring an action the night before
the Christie’s auction, it could have retained counsel to
search for the Palimpsest, or at least make some inquiries,
at some point during the previous seventy years.”325
In Sanchez v. Trustees of the University of
Pennsylvania,326 the district court displayed similar severity
towards the rather poor and uneducated heirs of Pablo
Sanchez when it dismissed, as barred by laches, their action
monastery in Constantinople. Id. at *34. Although the Patriarchate maintains
that the palimpsest must have been stolen from the monastery, it is unclear
what actually happened to the manuscript before Mr. Sirieix, a French
businessman, acquired the palimpsest sometime in the 1920s. Id at *6.
However, by lack of any document evidencing transfer of title of the palimpsest,
the circumstances surrounding his purchase are also unclear. Id. Since 1947,
Sirieix’s daughter, Anne Guersan, looked after the manuscript. Id. In the 1960s,
when the Guersans became concerned about the manuscript’s condition, they
showed it to several scholars and had it professionally restored. Id. at *67. In
the early 1970s, the Guersans first considered selling the palimpsest. Id. at *7.
Following international distribution of a brochure, the family received
numerous inquiries from American universities. Id. at *78. Eventually, they
consigned the palimpsest to Christie’s. Id. at *8. After additional research, it
was brought to New York for sale in October 1998. Id. at 9. One week before the
auction, the Patriarchate notified Christie’s that it believed it was the rightful
owner of the manuscript and filed an action seeking its return. Id.
321. Id at *9.
322. See id. at *1823.
323. Id. at *30.
324. Id. at *3132.
325. Id. at *31.
326. No. 04 Civ. 1253 (JSR), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1355 (S.D.N.Y. July 19,
2004), later proceeding, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 636 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2005).
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for recovery of a valuable collection of preColumbian
artifacts.327 The artifacts had been stolen from the plaintiffs’
grandfather over eighty years ago and ultimately
transferred to the University of Pennsylvania in 1920.328 In
2003, Sanchez’s grandson Luis was finally able to locate the
artifacts and demanded their return, which the university
refused.329 Although the plaintiffs’ education and income
level were poor, they were admonished by the court:
But how much money or education does it take to write letters, do
a little research in the relevant literature, ask a librarian at the
New York Public Library (whose main branch is close to Luis’
apartment) to help do such research, or, in more recent years, do
an internet search? The desultory efforts Sanchez engaged in
between 1970 and the present are not remotely enough to satisfy
330
the requirements of a diligent search.

Indeed, over the years, the family’s efforts to trace the
collection had been limited.331 They did not write to any
galleries or museums, nor did they ask for help from experts
on archaeology or preColumbian art.332 Pablo Sanchez’s
grandson only started actively looking for the artifacts in
1985, when he visited the Metropolitan Museum of Art and
several New York art galleries.333 However, when he finally
hired an attorney, the latter was able to locate the collection
at the University of Pennsylvania within a few months.334
Therefore, the court held that, “no reasonable factfinder
could find that [Sanchez’s] efforts were diligent.”335
It is obvious from the foregoing that in assessing the
plaintiff’s diligence, the court also takes into consideration
how difficult or unlikely it was for him to actually retrieve
his property. In In re AshPeters, the court observed that,
like the Glaser heirs, the Otten family who had acquired the
327. Sanchez, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1355, at *4.
328. Id. at *2.
329. Id.
330. Sanchez, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 636, at *910.
331. See id. at *4.
332. Id. at *5.
333. Id.
334. Id. at *56.
335. Id. at *8.

2011]

HAS THE TIME (OF LACHES) COME?

685

Munch painting lived in Manhattan. The painting had been
exhibited as part of the Otten collection at prominent
museums, galleries, and universities during the second half
of the twentieth century, so that it was possible for the
Glaser heirs to have rediscovered the painting earlier.336
It is clear that in this respect, the potential of today’s
level of information technology is a twoedged sword. The
breakthrough of the internet around the millennium was a
reason for optimism for victims of art theft and looting, as
online databases and worldscale theft registries
significantly boosted chances of recovery. However,
technology can also turn against them, not in the context of
discovering the whereabouts of stolen artwork, but because
of the subsequent legal embroilments that can ensue. In
practice, courts take into consideration the fact that
information that allows for faster discovery is somehow
within an original owner’s reach. In addition, well
intentioned mechanisms that were developed to assist in
recovery of stolen works quickly became easy criteria for
dismissing the original owner’s action. As the facilities
available to victims of art theft increased, so did the
standards of due diligence. This bittersweet irony seems
especially true with respect to Naziera lootings, where
there have been numerous initiatives to seek recovery, both
in the immediate years after World War II and more
recently in the wake of the late 1990s revival. Courts that
look for “equitable” reasons to dismiss an original owner’s
action in replevin on laches grounds can easily find a
“crucial” means of redress the owner did not undertake. It is
especially worrying that the heirs of Holocaust victims
would be judged on the fact that their ancestors did not
avail themselves of postwar restitution programs. Many did
not survive and their heirs were not always aware of the
possessions of their relatives. Those surviving the
concentration or extermination camps most likely had other
priorities in the months following their return.
Finally, time is perhaps the defendant’s best ally.
Where in the 1990s, in view of the very recent
declassification of war and Holocaustrelated files,337
336. In re AshPeters, 821 N.Y.S.2d 61, 6869 (App. Div. 2006).
337. LUBINA, supra note 219, at 161; Pollock, supra note 220, at 198; Turner,
supra note 220, at 151920; Collins, supra note 19, at 119; Cuba, supra note 21,
at 44849; Minkovich, supra note 29, at 353.
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defendants may have had difficulty claiming that the
original owner unreasonably delayed commencing suit, each
passing day now makes the burden of proof more difficult
for the original owner.
2. Prejudice. With regard to the prejudice requirement,
the passage of time is even more advantageous to the
defendant. In the mid1990s, the population of Holocaust
survivors who were adults and were established enough to
own artwork in the 1930s and 1940s began to shrink
drastically; by 2010, all of them, barring a few rare
exceptions, had died. Even the current numbers of the
younger generation, namely the wartime children, are
diminishing. The same trend holds true for those who
(inadvertently) bought looted art in the late 1930s, 1940s
and early 1950s.338 These observations are extremely
important, as they will have a decisive effect on most Nazi
era lawsuits. After all, for laches purposes, loss of evidence
is perhaps the most obvious harm flowing from the
plaintiff’s unreasonable delay.
It is noteworthy that in Wertheimer, the court held that
the delay caused the defendant prejudice in asserting his
possessory rights, because none of the parties to the original
bailment were alive.339 The court found it virtually
impossible for the current possessor to prove that any of its
predecessors in interest had acquired good title.340
Accordingly, the action was found barred by laches, and the
ruling was affirmed by the appellate division.341 In In re
AshPeters, the court similarly held that the plaintiff’s
action was barred by laches. The court emphasized that:

338. See Hector Feliciano et al., Nazi Stolen Art, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 67, 73
(1998); Pell, supra note 221, at 46; Pollock, supra note 220, at 198; Spiegler,
supra note 221, at 299; Turner, supra note 220, at 1520; Collins, supra note 19,
at 120; Minkovich, supra note 29, at 354.
339. Wertheimer v. Cirker’s Hayes Storage Warehouse, Inc., No. 105575/00,
2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 693, at *1819 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001), aff’d 752 N.Y.S.2d
295, 296 (App. Div. 2002).
340. Wertheimer, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 693, at *1819.
341. 752 N.Y.S.2d at 296 (“[W]hether this was the case, can no longer be
determined with any degree of certainty, the documentary record being very
scant and all persons with direct knowledge of the relevant matters apparently
having died long ago.”) (alteration in original).
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The delay by the Glaser family and the estate in asserting any
claim of ownership during the approximately 70year odyssey of
Strasse in Kragero has prejudiced the goodfaith purchaser since
none of the parties to the original sale of the painting—Professor
342
Glaser, Albert Otten and Paul Glaser—are alive.

Further, in In re Flamenbaum, the court made note of
the second prong of the test for laches: “A defense of laches
‘is deficient if it fails to include allegations showing not only
a delay, but also injury, change of position, intervention of
equities, loss of evidence, or other disadvantage resulting
from such delay.’”343 The court deemed that the death of the
key witnesses was a vital factor with regard to the prejudice
requirement:
As a result of the museum’s inexplicable failure to report the
tablet as stolen, or take any other steps toward recovery, diligent
goodfaith purchasers over the course of more than sixty years
were not given notice of a blemish in the title. That, coupled with
the fact that Riven Flamenbaum’s death has forever foreclosed his
ability to testify as to when and where he obtained the tablet, has
severely prejudiced the estate’s ability to defend the museum’s
related claim to the tablet. These are precisely the circumstances
344
in which the doctrine of laches must be applied.

The powerful impact of the death of direct witnesses on
the success of a laches defense is even more obvious in cases
where the theft occurred prior to the Nazilooting. In Greek
Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc.,345 the
court held that the seventyyear delay in coming forward to
claim ownership rendered it unfeasible for the Guersans to
prove ownership.346 “[T]he critical witness (Mr. Sirieix) [was]
deceased, memories [had] faded, and key documents,
assuming they existed at all, [were] missing.”347 Accordingly,
the passage of time rendered trial “virtually impossible,” as
the court “would be confronted with the Patriarchate’s claim
342. In re AshPeters, 821 N.Y.S.2d 61, 69 (App. Div. 2006).
343. In re Flamenbaum 899 N.Y.S.2d 546, 554 (Sur. Ct. 2010) (quoting
Glenesk v Guidance Realty Corp., 321 N.Y.S.2d 685, 688 (App. Div. 1971)).
344. Id.
345. No. 98 Civ. 7664 (KMW), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13257 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18,
1999).
346. Id. at *1.
347. Id. at *33.
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that it clearly possessed the Palimpsest at the beginning of
this century against defendants’ claim that they clearly
possess it at the end, with little or no evidence of what
happened in between.”348 In Sanchez, the theft had occurred
even earlier.349 It was therefore not surprising that the
district court found that allowing the lawsuit to proceed
more than eighty years after the theft would cause real and
substantial prejudice to the defendants. “The long delay
ha[d] resulted in deceased witness[es], faded memories, lost
documents, [and] hearsay testimony of questionable
value.”350 The court emphasized that, given all individuals
originally involved were long deceased, it was extremely
difficult for the defendants to substantiate: (1) that the
collection was not stolen or, (2) that they had made vigilant
efforts to ensure the purchase transaction was legal and
appropriate.351
Recent case law also highlights the pivotal role that
evidence from direct witnesses, or the loss of such evidence,
plays in the court’s assessment of the laches prejudice
requirement. Bakalar v. Vavra,352 another recent Holocaust
related title dispute regarding the ownership of a Schiele
drawing, entitled Seated Woman with Bent Left Leg,353
348. Id. at *3334.
349. Sanchez v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., No. 04 Civ. 1253 (JSR), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 636, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2005).
350. Id. (quoting Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618,
621 (App. Div. 1990)) (alteration in original).
351. Id.
352. Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), later proceeding, 550 F.
Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
353. Id. at 61. At the outbreak of World War II, the drawing belonged to Fritz
Grunbaum, a wellknown Viennese cabaret performer. Id. The Grunbaum
family was Jewish, and persecuted during the war. Id. Fritz died in Dachau in
1941, his wife Elisabeth in Maly Trostinec in 1942. Id. at 6162. What happened
to their extensive art collection between the German occupation of Austria in
1938 and 1952 is a mystery. Id. at 62. Between 1952 and 1956 the Galerie
Gutekunst in Bern, Switzerland, run by Eberhart Kornfeld, acquired numerous
works by Schiele from Mathilde Lukacs, who did not disclose that she was
Elisabeth Grunbaum’s sister. Id. In September 1956, the Galerie Gutekunst
sold the drawing and nineteen other Schiele works to a New York gallery.
Bakalar v. Vavra, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6689, at *3. There, David Bakalar, a
Massachusetts businessman, purchased the work for $3,300 on November 12,
1963. Bakalar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55438, at *34. In 2004, Bakalar
consigned the drawing to Sotheby’s, which auctioned it off in London for
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clearly illustrates the crucial role of this type of evidentiary
deficiency. This case involved a delay of over sixtyeight
years, during which witnesses had passed away, memories
had faded, and documents had disappeared.354 However, the
court refused to find laches as a matter of law, because a
central witness was still alive, namely the wartime art
dealer Kornfeld who had reintroduced the drawing in the
market in the 1950s.355
The foregoing analysis of case law discussed how in
most of these Naziera title disputes, all of the wartime
witnesses had already died. Within a decade, the few
remaining Holocaust survivors will most likely pass away.
While New York’s laches approach may have favored the
victims of Nazilooting who brought their claims in the
1990s, the equitable doctrine that initially seemed so owner
friendly is currently approaching its expiration date.
Owners’ benefits will likely terminate within the next few
years, and the laches defense will grow to become an
impervious shield for current possessors.
CONCLUSION
This Article analyzed recent developments in Holocaust
related art litigation in the New York forum. Restitution
lawsuits stemming from Naziera art spoliation are not only
compelling from a historical point of view; they also raise
interesting legal issues. Most notably, these disputes have
distinguishing features that advance and expound the law
concerning the timeliness of actions in replevin and
conversion, as they originate from decadesold looting of art
objects, which, unlike average consumer goods, are
enduring.
In common law jurisdictions, the concepts of statutory
limitation and laches play a central role in the assessment
approximately $726,000. Bakalar v. Vavra, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18343, at *6
7 (2d Cir. Sept 2, 2010). However, the sale was never consummated, because
Milos Vavra and Leon Fischer, whom an Austrian court in 2002 had declared to
be the legal heirs of Grunbaum’s estate, asserted a claim to the drawing. Id. On
March 21, 2005, Bakalar filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that he
was the drawing’s rightful owner and the heirs counterclaimed. Bakalar v.
Vavra, 237 F.R.D. at 61.
354. Bakalar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55438, at *11.
355. Id. at *1112.
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of the timeliness of the plaintiff’s claim. Although both of
these timerelated defenses endorse the same policy against
inertia in legal proceedings, they clearly differ. Statutory
limitation is a legislativelycreated, theoretically objective
mechanism, since the passage of time is its sole determining
factor. Laches, on the other hand, is an equitable defense
that takes into account subjective factors to assess both the
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s delay and the prejudice it
caused to the defendant.
In spite of common law’s solidly established nemo dat
rule, the passage of time actually affects the allocation of
rights and burdens between original owners and possessors
of stolen chattels. In that connection it is noteworthy that,
in order to assess the timeliness of an original owner’s
restitution claim, the New York courts reserve a role for
both timerelated defenses. According to Guggenheim v.
Lubell, New York law requires the courts first to apply a
“demand and refusal” rule in order to determine the time of
accrual for limitation purposes, after which the original
owner’s diligence in tracing his property is to be given
consideration under the doctrine of laches.
In developing this twostep approach, New York courts
clearly took into account the interests of the original owner.
Indeed, the “demand and refusal” rule allows aggrieved
owners to effectively postpone the time of accrual of the
cause of action so that they can bring their action
irrespective of the passage of time of the statute of
limitations’ designated time bar, provided that they have
satisfied the demand requirement. In addition, the
Guggenheim court refused to impose a due diligence
requirement on the original owner, but rather placed the
burden of proof on the purchaser by requiring him to show
under a laches theory that he had suffered prejudice due to
the original owner’s unreasonably minimal effort in tracing
his stolen property.
Based on a comprehensive survey of all publicly
available case law on the recovery of stolen art in the New
York forum, this Article called attention to the courts’
increasing receptiveness to the limitation and laches
defenses in stolen art litigation in general, and Holocaust
related title disputes in particular. Although they continued
to apply Guggenheim’s twostep approach of “demand and
refusal” and laches, the New York courts have increasingly
favored the current possessor over the past fifteen years,
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contrary to the Guggenheim court’s preference to safeguard
the rights of the original owner.
With regard to the limitation defense, this Article
questioned the New York courts’ rather discretionary
advance of the moment of accrual in the Grosz case, by
inferring an implicit refusal from the parties’ actions or
inactions, especially in Naziera art disputes where the
actual time of accrual is debatable. Moreover, the parties’
successful yet absurd exploitation of anomalies inherent in
the “demand and refusal” rule to accelerate accrual by
arguing bad faith is particularly objectionable, because it is
contrary to logic and good policy.
With regard to the laches defense, recent case law
clearly shows that whereas laches’ twofold requirement
proved practically insurmountable for defendants in pre
1995 cases, the courts have displayed increasing willingness
in finding that the passage of time was unreasonable and
resulted in prejudice.
As all claims eventually grow stale, it is evident that
there will always come a point where the passage of time is
more likely than not to be found excessive, so that the court
will deny the plaintiff’s action in replevin. This is obviously
not different for the field of Naziera art litigation. This
Article’s purpose was to call attention to a number of recent
developments regarding the limitation and laches defenses
that seem to have caused that shift. Indeed, taking into
consideration these recent developments, it is justified to
say that, henceforth, (heirs of) Holocaust survivors will most
likely no longer prevail in any attempt to obtain recovery of
their stolen heirlooms. Considering that all Holocaust
related art claims are bound to grow stale one day, it seems
that for the majority of the New York cases that time has
come.

